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ARTICLES

THE PROPERTY CONCEPT OF TRADE SECRETS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: AN ONGOING DEBATE
Miguel Deutch*
I. PREFACE
The law of trade secrets is central to the protection of commercial interests in information. The protection of information
by way of this law has certain advantages not provided by the
more "traditional" laws regulating intellectual property, advantages which amplify the growing interest of modern jurisprudence in trade secrets law.1 As has been correctly pointed out,
the "traditional" rules governing intellectual property are ill

suited to the demands of new technological developments.2 This
reality has increased the importance of the law of trade secrets,
in as much as it is both more flexible and general, and thus,
more easily applied to new technological situations.3

* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University;, Manager, Israel Institute for Continuing Legal Studies; Draftsman, Committee for Codification of Israeli
Civil Law.
1. See 1 M.F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW, § 1.01 (1985).
2. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus. Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1780, 1785
(1991); ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS,
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS & TRADEMARKS 44 (2d ed. 1995). For law's difficulty in
adapting itself to fast technological developments, see R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE
452-87 (4th ed. 1985).
3. The legal protection of the right in trade secrets developed at a relatively late
stage. In England the possibility of such protection was hinted at for the first time in
the matter of Perceval v. Philipps, 35 Eng. Rep. 225 (1813). In the matter of
Newberry v. James, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1817), the Court recognized the grounds for
claim in a suit for breach of trade secrecy, but rejected the petition for an injunction,
referring the plaintiff to the remedy of damages. See JAGER, supra note 1, § 2.01.
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Registration of a patent is neither the most convenient nor
the most efficient way of protecting information. Patent laws
are limited to products and processes and therefore do not protect all kinds of information.4 The laws of trade secrets, on the
other hand, protect almost the entire gamut of commercial
information.5 In addition, the crystallization of information into
Remedy was actually awarded on the grounds of misappropriation of a trade secret in
Yovett v. Winyard, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820). The jurisprudential basis of the law of
trade secrets was not discussed seriously until the famous case of Prince Albert v.
Strange, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849). The grounds for claim in England in those cases
were based upon the concept of "breach of confidence," which serves these days as
the central legal institution protecting trade secrets in England (in addition to the
claim based on contract law, when contractual relations may be inferred). See
ALLISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 3 (1992); ROBERT
DEAN, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 40-52 (1990). Protection of trade secrets was
supplied in American law for the first time in Vichey v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837).
See 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 2.02.
4. According to the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1953), protection is granted to
any new useful process, machine, manufacture of composition of matter, or any new
or useful improvement thereof."
5. The definition of "trade secret" in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §
757(b), includes a large scale of examples, the general requirement being that the
information "is used in one's business and (which) gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know how to use it."
The Restatement (First) also listed the six criteria for identifying the protected
objects. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995), defines a "trade secret" as, "any information that can be used in the operation of a
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an
actual or potential economic advantage over others." For the differences between the
original definition of the Restatement, and the current one, see 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM,
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS ch. 1 (1997); 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 3.03[2]. For an
exhaustive discussion on this criteria, see 1 MILGRIM, supra, § 1.01[4]; DORR &
MUNCH, supra note 2, at 44-47. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1979 (UTSA) prescribes a wide definition. -Trade secret," includes:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, performance, device, method, technique or process that: (I) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known, and not being
ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use and; (II) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id. § 1(4).
English law as well protects a large scale of objects. The protected information
includes information as to products (Seager v. Copydex Ltd., 2 All E.1L 415 (1967);
Cranleigh Provision Eng'g Ltd. v. Bryant, 1 W.L.R. 1293 (1965)); surveys (Survey &
Miniming Ltd. v. Morrison, Qd. . 470 (1969)); methods (Underwater Welders & Repairs Ltd. v. Street & Langthorne, R.P.C. 498 (1968)); drawings (Saltman Eng. Co.
Ltd. v. Campbell Eng. Co. Ltd., 3 All E.R. 413 (1963)).
In light of the fact that the protection of trade secrets in the English law is
found upon the claim of breach of confidence, and not upon a proprietary concept,
there is obviously no place to differentiate sorts of information but according to their
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a registered patent entitling its owner to monopolistic protection6 involves the disclosure of that information.7 The monopoly is granted for a strictly limited period8 at the end of which
the proprietary interest in the information expires and it is released for general usage.
The laws of copyright are also limited in the scope of protection that they provide. They protect only the form in which the
idea is expressed and not the idea itself.9 Although there has
been an attempt within English jurisprudence to expand the
copyright scope, 10 whereby it would also protect the design of
industrial products, this attempt proved justifiably shortlived
despite initial and partial success."

confidential character.
6. For the extent of the monopoly granted by a patent in the American system,
see S. Davidson, Reverse Engineering and the Development of Compatible and Competitive Products under U.S. Law, 5 COMPUTER SCL HIGH TECH L.J. 329, 408-09 (1989).

See also University Computing Corp. v. Lykes-Youngs Town Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534
(1974).

A theoretical dispute exists as to whether from a conceptual point of view, the
protection of a patent should be viewed as a monopoly. This, as a monopoly derogates
welfare from society, while as, in the case of patents, the inventor supplies an additional welfare to society, meaning the invention which will become available to the
public when the patent expires. See Christopher S. Marchese, Promoting the Progress
of the Useful Arts by Narrowing Best Mode Disclosure Requirements in Patent Law,
54 U. Prrrs. L. REV. 589 (1993).
7. For the "best mode disclosure" requirement, see Davidson, supra note 6;
Marchese, supra note 6.
8. In American law, protection is usually granted for a period of 17 years and in
the pharmaceutical field for a period of 22 years.
9. For English law, see generally COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT (E.P.

Skone James et al. eds., 13th ed. 1991). For American law, see 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT § 2.3 (2d ed. 1996).
10. In British Leyland v. Armstrong Patents, 1 All E.R. 850 (1986), the court, by
a majority decision, acknowledged in principle that copyright law protects the producer of a useful article against copying of the design of the article by a competitor,
although the article itself is not an artistic work. The court held that such copying
constitutes an indirect copying of another work; the drawings of the article. British
Leyland dealt specifically with the copying of exhaust pipes, and the court dismissed
the claim preferring to protect the interests of the purchasers of cars, thereby allowing such purchasers to use the cars efficiently by freely purchasing replacement parts
from other producers.
11. The English law has been amended in this point. See The Copyright, Design
and Patents Act, 1988, § 51 (Eng.). According to that section, the design of an article
should not be protected against copying through the copyright of the drawings of the
article, unless the three-dimensional article to which the drawings relate may be
classified as an artistic work.
In American law, copyright is denied regarding the design of useful articles,
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Finally, the right in the goodwill of a business also functions
as a source for protecting commercial interests. Yet, while having been recognized as an asset, and even as a property
right,' this right has not been granted absolute protection
against third parties acting in good faith."3 Furthermore, the
content of the right is limited, for it prohibits only the
unconsented use of those qualities that create the appeal for
the customers, but does not protect the goodwill's owner against
unconsented use of information concerning consumers.14
Trade secrets law constitutes an important. jurisprudential
junction at which legal arrangements deriving from varied
branches of law become applicable. These include, inter alia:
contract law; tort law (particularly the law of unfair competition); unjust enrichment law; law of confidence; labor law; and
privacy law. However, the recognition of the right in a trade
secret as a separate "legal entity" (as opposed to its being only
an interest to which the abovementioned general laws apply) is
doubtful if the right will not be classified as an in rem right.
The issue which arises, therefore, is one which is in constant
dispute within the Anglo-American law: Should the right in
trade secrets be classified as an in rem right? In American

unless "[iut incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects
of the article." Copyright Act § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); see also GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 9, § 2.5.3.
12. CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, THE LAW OF PASSING OFF 49 (2d ed. 1995). "Goodwill
is undoubtedly legal property and its nature is reasonably well understood." Id. See
also Spalding & Bros. v. A.W. Gamage Ltd., 32 R.P.C. 273, 284 (1915); Star Indus.
Co. Ltd. v. Yap Kwee Kor, F.S.R. 256, 261 (1976).
13. Misrepresentation by the defendant is the essence of the tort of passing off.
'The essence of the tort of passing off is a misrepresentation made by the defendant
which is &flculated to cause damage to the business or goodwill of the plaintiff."

WADLOW, supra note 12, at 179. "The action for passing off does not confer monopoly
rights. Passing off recognizes no exclusive right to any name, mark or get-up." Id. at
181.
Indeed, a mental element is not required. Id. at 200-01. Yet the need for misrepresentation by the defendant restricts the scope of protection. If no misrepresenta-

tion is performed, the tort of passing off does not apply. If the defendant did not act
in good faith, and no misrepresentation exists, the applicability of the general rules of

unfair competition should be considered. This issue is beyond the scope of this article.
14. Thus, an ex-employee is free to approach the ex-employer's customers, notwithstanding the right of the employer in goodwill, unless the customers' names are
trade secrets, the employee is in breach of a restraint of trade clause, or a dishonest
act has been performed. See DEAN, supra note 3, at 213.
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jurisprudence the following widely quoted dictum is frequently
encountered: "[Tihe word 'property' as applied to trademarks
and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some
rudimentary requirements of good faith... the property may
be denied, but the confidence cannot be."' This dictum clearly
emphasizes the personal non-proprietal aspect. Although similar
dicta in American law have denied recognition of the right in a
trade secret as an in rem right,'6 there are also many who
support the opposite view.' English jurisprudence has also
spoken in two voices, even though the more accepted view denies the in rem nature of the right in trade secrets, predicating
the right on fiduciary or contractual relationships.
Society's interest in preserving the confidentiality of commercial information has become critically important for modern
economies. Thus, the resolution of the discussed dispute is of
essential significance in commercial law.
Two preliminary comments should be made prior to entering
the fray. First, above and beyond relating to the status of goodwill as a source from which inspiration and analogies may be
drawn for solutions in the field of trade secrecy, it has been
argued that trade secrets constitute an integral part of the
goodwill of a business. Therefore as the right concerning goodwill is recognized as an in rem right, and the right in a trade

15. See E.L du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917); see
also 1 MILGRIM, supra note 5, § 1.01[1].
16. See, e.g., Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1060
(1973); Valco Cincinnati Inc. v. N.S.O. Machining, 492 N.E.2d 814 (1986); 1 JAGER,
supra note 1, § 4.07 [3].
17. See, e.g., St. Michaels Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369 (9th
Cir. 1981); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Lee v. Cercoa Inc., 433 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Rockwell Graphic Sys.
Inc. v. DEV Indus. Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1780, 1785 (1981); 1 JAGER, supra note 1, §
4.01(3), at 1-2; 1 MILGRIM, supra note 5, at ch. 2; Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and
Property, 38 U. ToRoNTO L.J. 117, 133 (1988).
18. For support of the in rem version, see Seager v. Copydex, 2 All E.R& 415
(1967); for its denial, see COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 30; Boardman v. Phipps, 2 A.C.
46, 128 (1967). For an exhaustive analysis of the authorities, concluding that the

right in a trade secret is not an in rem right, see DEAN, supra note 3, at 53. See
also W.&. CORNISH, INTELLECTuAL PRoPERTY 232, 240-41 (2d ed. 1989).
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secret is a part of that right, it necessarily follows that the
right in a trade secret should be classified as well as an in rem
right. 19
Such argument is problematic even while assuming the in
rem nature of the right in goodwill. For even though a trade
secret is one of the factual components enhancing the value of
the goodwill, it does not follow that the right in a trade secret
is an element of the legal right in goodwill. The right in goodwill prohibits a party from arrogating the goodwill of another's
business to himself and in doing so, attract his clients. The law
of trade secrets, on the other hand, seeks to prevent accessibility to information regarding clients and its use in soliciting the
clients. The prohibitions imposed by each right are different,
and thus their legal classification is not necessarily similar.
Second, an assessment of the in rem nature of the right in
trade secrets should bear in mind the jurisprudential differences between intellectual property and tangible property. Features
of the right in trade secrets which do not generally characterize
tangible property, but yet do fit intellectual property, may suffice in order to categorize the right in a trade secret as an in
rem right.

II. A METHODOLOGICAL REMARK
An examination of the in rem nature of a right may be required for one of two purposes. The law may assume that a
given right is an in rem one, while failing to specify all the features of the right. The interpreter's task in such a case is to
identify the relevant missing features, which would be commensurate with the in rem nature of the right.
The need to examine the in rem nature of a right may also
arise in other cases, in which some of the features of the right
are established in a given legal instrument, while the classification of the right is not indicated. In such a case, the interpreter
should first infer from the features prescribed by the legal in-

19. See DEAN, supra note 3, at 59-60. This argument is particularly relevant
when lists of costumers are concerned. See also Bolliger v. Costa Brava Wine Co.
Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 227 (1961).
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strument whether the right bears an in rem nature. The assumption would be that if the right under discussion evidences
most of the typical features generally characterizing an in rem
right, the lacking features should be "filled in" by assuming
those features that would normally appear in an in rem right.
The trade secrets case falls prima facie within the second
abovementioned category of cases. The law does not assume a
priori the in rem character of this right. Varied characterizations of the right in a trade secret have been moulded within
the Anglo-American case law and legal literature but other
important features have not yet been elaborated. Should they
be determined according to the decision on the in rem nature of
the right? At this juncture, Dean's comment bears mention. He
points out that such methodology may lead into a vicious circle:
"For example, an argument that because third parties are enjoined in certain circumstances, confidential information is property, and because confidential information is property, third
parties are enjoined, is superfluous and circular, unless it is to
predict the Court's treatment of confidential information in all
circumstances."" Indeed, Dean is correct in cautioning against
a vicious circle. Current jurisprudence provides no definitive
doctrine regarding the effect of the right in a trade secret upon
innocent third parties, and trade secrets law cannot be said to
confer an in rem right by virtue of any assumed effect of the
right on such third parties. Such effect may derive from the in.
rem nature of the right, but the classification of the right as
being in rem must first be established.
I The "mosaic" methodology referred to above would attempt to
examine the uncontested features of the right in a trade secret.
Should it emerge from such examination that this right confers
a "critical mass" of in rem features, the conclusion would be
that the right is in rem, thus allowing inferences to be made
regarding the missing elements. In the context of the right in
trade secrets, however, the "mosaic" methodology is insufficient.
Such an approach is useful when the missing features are of
marginal importance. Yet, without any preliminary convention
regarding the protection of the right in a trade secret against
innocent third parties, it is impossible to identify a "critical
20. DEAN, supra note 3, at 61.
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mass" of elements that would endorse an in rem classification
of the right. Consequently, the decision concerning the effect of
the right in a trade secret on innocent third parties must be
independently established. It is only upon concluding that an
extensive defense ought to be conferred in the right against
third parties (if indeed such is the conclusion), that the "mosaic
methodology" can be applied as a means of allocating additional
features to the right in a trade secret, features which are not
yet identified by jurisprudence.
HI. TERMINOLOGY: "IN REM RIGHT" OR "PROPRIETARY RIGHT"?

The theoretical dispute regarding the in rem nature of the
right in a trade secret derives in part from a misinterpretation
of terms. Two terms should be differentiated: "proprietary right"
and "in rem right." Frequently, the statement that a trade
secret is "property" is actually not intended to convey the notion of an "in rem" right but rather a "proprietary right."2 '
"Proprietary rights" are merely rights bearing economic significance.22 This category consists of rights of different natures,
amongst them, obligatory rights which are the "negative" of the
in rem rights.' An obligatory right is also an asset and thus a
proprietary right.
Therefore, an argument which emphasizes the asset quality
of the right in trade secrets, as for example, the negotiability of
the right, does not properly distinguish between different kinds
of proprietary rights, and thus does not confer the right in a
trade secret with an in rem status. An obligatory right, for
example, is negotiable, even though it is obviously not an in
rem right.' The terminological differentiation between the notion of "proprietary right" and "in rem right" should be taken
into consideration, for example, when examining Milgrim's analysis of the nature of trade secrets. 5 Milgrim argues that a
trade secret is "property" by virtue of factors including its negotiability and its functioning as an "asset" in the context of
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
See SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 238 (P.J. Fitzgerald ed., 12th ed. 1966).
See id. at 239.
See, e.g., id. at 446.
See 1 MILGPJM, supra note 5.
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bankruptcy proceedings." The author assesses these elements
as indicating that rights in a trade secret are in the nature of
property right."7 Yet, such elements only lead to the conclusion that the right is proprietary and by themselves do not
suffice to establish the in rem character of the right."
Indeed, in various contexts, when using the term "property"
the law is in fact referring to a "proprietary right" and not to
an "in rem" right. Such is the case of the term "property" in
the American Constitution.' As far as the constitutional protection against "taking" is concerned, law should not differ in
principle between the taking of an in rem right or any other
proprietary right. All proprietary interests should be protected.
Yet, when dealing with the complicated question regarding the
intensity of the protection which should be granted to trade
secrets against third parties, the classification of the right in a
trade secret as a "proprietary right" does not yet lead to an
answer, and the in rem issue has to be resolved.
IV.

THE AIMS OF PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS AND THE
IN REM CONCEPT-A GENERAL VIEW

Assessment of the goals of providing legal protection for trade
26. In previous releases of Milgrhn's book, the author has dealt at length with
the in rem issue, citing these features as evidence of the right in a trade secret being a "property right." See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 5, at cl. 1. In the present release
this issue is dealt with only briefly. See id. at ch.2. He notes that in the interim,
solutions have been found for many of the issues that previously demanded a decision
to the in rem question for their resolution.
27. Id. at ch. 2.
28. It is quite unclear whether Milgrim uses the term "property" in order to describe an in rem right or rather just a proprietary one. Sometimes it seems clear
that he refers to an in rem right: "This right is no less a property right than is the
so called 'exclusive right' under the Copyright Act of 1976." 1 MLGRIM, supra note 5,
§ 2.01. Copyright is undoubtedly an in rem right. See id. "The property right in anything is always a relational right, i.e., the right that an owner may have vis-a-vis the
world." I&L § 2.01 [1]. See also text § 2.01 [2] following n.18: Milgrim uses the term
"property" examples representing in rem rights, like patents, copyright and ownership
in land.
On the other hand, Milgrim sometimes seems to refer, while using the term
"property," just to the proprietary character of the trade secret. See id. § 2.02 n.1.
See also id. § 2.01. Milgrim stated that a "property right" is the "implicit mechanism
that permits a court to recognize any remedy, be it for breach of a contract or confidential relationship." Id.
29. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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secrets may indicate a resolution of the in rem issue. There are
three possible approaches. One approach would argue that the
protection of the right in a trade secret should promote personal norms of commercial fairness. Another approach views the
proprietary aspect of trade secrets as the dominant element. A
third approach regards the protection of commercial secrecy as
part of the general protection of privacy. It is the second approach that more readily leads to a conclusion that the right in
a trade secret is an in rem right.
American case law has adopted a variety of approaches regarding the goals of trade secrets law. Several cases have ruled
that these laws are intended exclusively for the protection of
commercial ethics. 0 Others maintain that the goal is to encourage inventions for the public welfare. 1 Such an approach
would advocate the proprietary character of the right. Another
approach sees both of the above goals as being functional. 2
There are those that recognize the validity of the two aforementioned goals, yet emphasize the promotion of inventions as
being the dominant factor in formation of legal policy.' Finally, there are those that emphasize the element of the protection
of privacy.'
As mentioned above, in English law the protection of trade
secrets is based upon the laws of confidentiality.' In this system, the encouragement of inventions does not serve as a goal
for protecting trade secrecy. Not surprisingly, English jurisprudence generally negates an in rem concept for trade secrets,
though there are those who have expressed support for it."5
It would appear that none of the abovementioned approaches
can claim exclusivity and that they are reflected in the law of
trade secrets. The desire to ensure commercial ethics is an
30. See 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 1.03.

31. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Fowle v. Park,
131 U.S. 88 (1889); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
1847 (1989); Davidson, supra note 6; 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 1.04.
32. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1973).

33. See, e.g., College Watercolor Group, Inc. v. Newbauer, 360 A.2d. 200 (1976).
For further authorities, see 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 1.04.
34. See Bonito Boats, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1847 (1989); 1 JAGER, supra note 1, §
1.05.

35. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 18.
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overall legal aim, achievable by prohibition of varied unethical
acts irrespective of whether they infringe upon rights which can
be defined as intellectual property. The relevant question is
whether the ethical aim ought to be complemented by the aim
of encouraging invention and commercial initiatives for public
welfare. As will be demonstrated below, an affirmative answer
should be given to this question.
Regarding the element of privacy, it should be noted that the
central concern of privacy laws differs from that of trade secrets. In the privacy context, the prevention of others' access to
information is the essence of the law.3" In the context of trade
secrets, the major concern is prevention of the commercial use
of information by the defendants and others.88
How does an approach recognizing the in rem nature of the
right in a trade secret cope with the general justifications for
classification of in rem rights? Recognition of intellectual property is primarily based upon the desire to reward the creator or
inventor, in order to provide an incentive for people to create
and invent, thereby promoting the interests of society as a
whole.39 Priority is given to the public interest, while reward
for the individual serves as a means for realizing that interest.' This is an aspect of the economic-utilitarian approach.41
Public interest, for example, dictates the imposition of substantive restrictions on the scope of protection afforded for intellec-

37. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
38. Notwithstanding the abovementioned, for the view that the protection of trade

secrets is an aspect of the protection of personality, see Weinrib, supra note 17, at
126.
39. This is eminent in the American Constitution. It enables Congress to enact in
the field of intellectual property only in order to advance science and useful arts. See
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cL 8.
40. See 1 LIPScOMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 2:1, at 70 (3d ed. 1984).
41. For analysis of intellectual property laws from an economic point of view,
emphasizing the aim of patent laws to enlarge public welfare, see Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Hilton Davis
Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (F. Cir. 1995); Roche Prod. v.
Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (F. Cir. 1984); Hassle v. Apotex, Inc., 44 D.LRl4th

755 (1987) (Can.); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law
and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 3 (1991); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System; 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COL. L. REV. 839 (1990); see also ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1990).
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tual property and upon its duration, in addition to the possibility of dictating compulsory licenses or blocking owner's claims
when the owner does not utilize the right.42
Is the provision of in rem protection for trade secrets consistent with the abovementioned justification for protecting intellectual property? An affirmative answer should be given when
dealing with a trade secret of a "know how" kind. The exploitation of "know how" is also of benefit to society, even if significantly less than the contribution of a registered patent within
which the information is disclosed to the public. This basic
difference regarding the respective contribution of the two
rights to society influences the scope of the defense, but society
is also interested in encouraging new unregistered inventions.
The contribution to society is less remarkable, although not
negligible, when the commercial information does not involve
any "know how." Legal protection provided to trade advantages,
even if not included in the category of "know how," promotes
commercial initiative and development of competitive capacity.
One of the general theoretical justifications for recognition of
in rem rights is the "labor theory," according to which recognition ought to be given to the interest of a person in the fruits
of his labor. This is not only due to the public interest in production of assets, but also to considerations of justice.' The
"labor theory" is easily applied to trade secrets belonging to the
category of "know how," but seems less appropriate for other
types of protected secrets like lists of clients. Yet, numerous
precedents have required some investment of effort, time or
moneyholding for protection of secrets not classified as "know
how."4' According to this approach, the labor theory may pro42. For compulsory licenses in England, see, for example, in the realm of registered designs, The Registered Designs Act, 1949, § 10(1) (Eng.); in the field of patents, see The Patents Act, 1977, § 48-54 (Eng.); RICHARDS BUTLER ON COPYRIGHT,
DESIGNS AND PATENTS: THE NEW LAW 346-47 (Robert Merkin ed., 1989) [hereinafter
BUTLER ON COPYRIGHT]. In American law, a compulsory license may be enforced only
in favor of government, in appropriate cases. However, the claim of the owner of a
patent may be blocked if there is "misuse." See, with respect to trademarks, 1 PETER
D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 4-56-1 (2d ed. 1986).
43. Regarding patents, see 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, § 17.06, at 17-43. For the
"labour theory" as justifying property rights, see Edward Andrew, Inalienable Right
Alienable Property and Freedom of Choice: Locke, Nozick and Marx on the Alienability
of Labour, 18 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 529 (1985); LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PHILOSoPHIC FOUNDATIONS 65 (1977).
44. For the English system, see Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Central News
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vide an appropriate justification for granting in rem protection
for all types of secrets.
This analysis indicates only that the aims of the protection of
the rights in a trade secret are generally in harmony with the
aims of the laws regarding intellectual property. The details of
the right in trade secrets must still be examined through the
prism of the detailed in rem model. This model dictates two
levels of analysis, the first being the level of legal policy. The
determination of whether a given right warrants an in rem
defense is first and foremost a value judgment. The central
consideration would be the intensity which the legal system
wishes to attach to the expectations of the entitled party.'
The second level of analysis examines the structural characteristics of the right. For any particular right to be classified as
an in rem right, its substantive characteristics must be commensurate with the inherent features of the in rem model in
general. While initially dealing with the second level, the analysis below will be conducted on both levels.
V.

THE COMPATIBILTY OF THE RIGHT IN A TRADE SECRET

WITH THE IN REM MODEL
A. Publicity of the Right
A basic characteristic of the in rem right is its publicized
nature.' As the in rem right largely affects third parties, even
those who are not actually aware of its existence, there is no

Ltd., 2 ch. 48, 53 (1987). For New Zealand, see Interfirm Comparison (Australia)Pty
Ltd. v. Law Society of N.S.W., 2 N.S.W.L.R. 104, 117 (1975); DEAN, supra note 3, at

115-17.
Various American authorities suggest that the purpose of trade secrets law is
to promote inventions. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979);
Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 9
U.S.P.Q.2d 1847 (1989); Davidson, supra note 6; 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 1.04.
45. See Cheryl L Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Laura S. Underkufiler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1990). For the legal policy factor as to the in rem
qualification of rights, see Weinrib, supra note 17, at 122.
46. See Vera Bolgar, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 204,
214 (1953); Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerous Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE 239, 249 (John Eekelaar & John
Bell eds., 1987).
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justification for this result unless the third parties had potential notice thereof by way of its publicity.
Does the requirement for publicity equally apply in the area
of intellectual property? The status of one of the rights in this
context, namely that of copyright, is quite complex and particularly relevant for our purposes. Undoubtedly, copyright is an in
rem right which provides the owner with protection against all
third parties.47 The English law of 1988 expressly declares the
in rem nature of copyright.' The question arises whether in
light of the publicity principle, there is any justification for
providing in rem protection to copyright, in the English or
American system. The English system does not enable registration of copyright at all, and the American system does not
allow registration to constitute a condition for protection of the
right, notwithstanding the existence of provisions which encourage publicity.49 The answer to this question bears important
analogical implications for the assessment of the in rem character of the right in trade secrets.
Infringement of copyright requires that there be an act of
"copying," whereby the work of the defendant is based upon the
work of the plaintiff." This being so, can it be said that the
publicity of the work itself (or the defendant's actual knowledge
of the work) fulfills the requirement of publicity with respect to
copyright? The answer is that the work itself does not necessarily attest to the existence of rights in it, and certainly not to
the identity of its owners. It should be noted that copyright is
vested not only in works published by publishers under the
name of the author, but also in other kinds of works. The law
demands copying in order to establish a cause of action because
the existence of copying is essential in order to establish misappropriation of the owner's rights, as opposed to a case in which
the defendant merely created an independent work occasionally
similar to the plaintiffs work.5 Copyright law thus provides in
47. See, e.g., 1 HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS 1 (2d ed. 1995).
48. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 1(1) (Eng.); see also
MICHAEL F. FLINT ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE NEW LAW 5 (1989).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
50. See, e.g., COPINGER & JAMES, supra note 9, at 166; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note
9, § 7.2.
51. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, § 7.2; DAvID I. BAINBRIDGE, INTELLECTUAL
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rem protection to works, without demanding publicity of the
right.
Indeed, copyright law alleviates to some extent the difficulty
created by the provision of in rem attributes to copyright in a
manner contrary to the principle requiring publicity of in rem
rights. In English law, in cases of secondary infringement in
which the defendant deals with infringing copies, 2 the cause
of action is conditioned upon the defendant being aware of the
prior rights.' In cases of primary infringement, as when the
defendant publishes the plaintiffs work without authorization,
the English system adopts a hybrid approach. It differentiates
between the remedies of injunction and damages. Damages, as
opposed to an injunction, will not be awarded if the defendant
did not know, and was not required to know, about the existence of another's copyright over the work." The law thus applies the general in rem concept to the injunction remedy by
granting partial immunity to the innocent defendant in light of
the publicity problem. Yet it should be noted that this immunity is rather limited and frequently impractical. The defendant
has to show that he was neither aware, nor required to know,
of the existence of any copyright over the work.5" It does not
suffice that the defendant assumed he was not performing any
infringement.56 If, for example, a person purports to sell to a
publisher the copyright over a work of which he is not the
owner, thereby misleading the publisher, the publisher will not
be immune from the damages remedy because he was aware of
the copyright over the work, despite being mislead about the
identity of the owner.
In American copyright law the basic rule is that "innocent
intent should no more constitute a defense in an infringement
action than in the case of.. tangible personalty."57 Even so, a
more lenient approach is adopted regarding damages where the

PROPERTY 99 (2d ed. 1994).
52. For the distinction between primary
COPINGER & JAMES, supra note 9, at 161.

and

secondary infringements,

53. See id.
54. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 97(1) (Eng.).
55. See COPINGER & JAMES, supra note 9, at 315-17.

56. See BUTLER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, at 98-99.
57. 3 MELvLLnE B. NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (1995).

see
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infringing party was acting in good faith. Hence, for works
distributed prior to the effect of the Bern Convention Implementation Amendments Act,58 section 405(b) of the Copyright
Act,5" stipulates that a third party's reliance upon the omission
of copyright notice, in an authorized copy, exempts him from
damages for any infringing acts committed before he received
actual notice, even though the Court still has a discretionary
power to award remedies in such situations." For works distributed after that date the good faith defense serves only to
somewhat decrease the damages awardable as statutory damages (as opposed to actual damages), provided that the "infringer
was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her
acts constituted an infringement of copyright ......

In this

context, whether overt public acts were done that publicized the
rights is highly relevant.
It may therefore be concluded that, notwithstanding the absence of publicity, the law of copyright provides an in rem defense to the right while only an extremely qualified immunity
is granted to the defendant in respect of damages. Hence, the
requirement of publicity is not a conditio sine qua non for conferring in rem rights in this area.
At this point it will be useful to turn to the issue of publicity
within the context of trade secrets law. It first should be noted
that the issue is not whether the trade secret itself has been
publicized, but rather whether the rights attaching to the secret
have been publicized. In other words, our concern is with the
publicity of the right and not publicity of the subject of the
right. The publicity of the trade secret itself, as opposed to the
publicity of the rights attaching thereto, is antithetic regarding
the existence of the right in a trade secret since publication of
the information results in the expiration of the right.' The
issue therefore relates to publicity concerning the identity of the
owner of the trade secret.

58. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
60. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, § 9.4.1.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1994).
62. See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 3, at 123; 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 6.03; KATE
BREARLY & SELWYN BLOCH, EMPLOYMENT COVENANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND TECHNIQUE, 83-88 (1993).
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The implications of the analogy between copyright and trade
secrets on the in rem issue will be analyzed further in this
article.' As to the analogy between the publicity of the right
in a trade secret and the right in a patent, it should be noted
that the publicity of the right in a trade secret is inferior to the
publicity in a registered patent." Yet the substantive content
of the right in a trade secret is obviously different from that of
a claim based upon a patent. In contrast to a patent, the owner
of a trade secret does not require a monopoly on the information and no rule prevents a defendant from obtaining the information from independent sources.65 The owner of the secret
only requires protection against the use and transfer of the
information which has been unfairly removed from his control.
It is in this sense that the right in a trade secret is more analogous to copyright than to other intellectual assets that are
statutorily registered and which confer a monopoly. It may
therefore be argued that just as the problems posed by the lack
of publicity do not nullify the in rem protection for copyright,
similar problems do not necessarily serve as an obstacle in the
area of trade secrecy.
At this stage it would be helpful to examine the system's
approach to the question of publicity in relation to another kind
of asset: chattel. Possession constitutes a central factor of publicity, particularly in the area of chattels, in view of the concept
that possession creates a representation of ownership." Yet,
unconsented removal of the asset from the owner's control does
not negate the owner's prior right of ownership.6" The initial

63. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
64. Registration of a patent establishes a maximal and clear claim of right, open
to public for inspection. In the context of trade secrecy, the publicity factor which
might be identified is control over the information, which is necessarily a weaker
indication to the existence of rights on behalf of the person in control. See infra text
following note 70.
65. See 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 3.03[3][a]. "Unlike a patent owner, a person who
possesses a trade secret does not have an exclusive right to the information. A trade
secrets claim is always subject to the defenses of independent development or reverse
engineering." Id.
66. See generally, with respect to the conceptual basis for viewing possession as
indicating and justifying rights, Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title,
13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979). See also, DIAS, supra note 2, at 295; 1 MILGRIM, supra
note 5, § 2.02[1]. Clearly, in a system regulating registration concerning rights in
land the possession factor in this field is less significant.
67. RAY ANIDREWS BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.3 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed.,
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publicity creating the original right suffices. For example, if a
thief transfers an asset to a third party through the black market, the absence of publicity in favor of the owner at the time
of the sale to the third party (at which stage the thief has
possession) does not nullify the owner's right to it. Once the
right has crystallized the absence of publicity in later stages
does not detract from its validity.
By definition a trade secret cannot be "possessed," possession
being a feature unique to tangible assets. Even so, effective
control may be exercised over the information, and it is arguable that such control is equivalent to possession." Control
over a secret is equivalent to control over the exclusivity of
knowledge or utilization of the information.6 9 The existence of
such control is a condition for the very existence of the right in
trade secrets according to the "internal" rules governing the
laws of trade secrecy. The owner of the trade secret must adopt
measures to prevent its publication beyond the limited circle of
persons bound by obligations of confidentiality, and must give
appropriate warnings regarding confidentiality to all others who
come into contact with the information." An onus is therefore
imposed upon him, to create a "protected zone" for the information, that zone being metaphorically marked with an ownership
sign. It may thus be argued that whenever a person has protected rights under the substantive rules of trade secrets there
exists a dimension of publicity with respect to the identity of
the owner of the right, prior to the misappropriation of the
secret from the owner's control. For example, where the owner
of the trade secret guards the relevant documentation in a safe
or other means of safekeeping, third parties know, or should
know, at that stage that the owner has control and a claim to
ownership over any information so kept. Indeed, in such a case,
the manifestation of control is not totally unequivocal and the
defendant is not necessarily aware of the adoption of measures
for controlling the information. Even so, with respect to chat-

1975); CHARLEs DONAHUE, JR., ET AL, PROPERTY-AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT
AND THE INSTrrUT0N 44 (3d ed. 1993).

68. Control is actually the essence of possession. See SALMOND, supra note 22, at
270-74.
69. The factor of exclusion of others is central to the notion of possession. See
SALMOND, supra note 22, at 272.
70. See infra Part V.B.
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tels, while the publicity of rights by way of possession is not as
strong as it is in comparison with a case where statutory registration applies, it nonetheless suffices.7 1 Indeed, if the trade
secret was misappropriated from the owner and thereafter
transferred to a third party, the latter is frequently unaware of
the owner's original rights over the secret. This is also the situation when chattels come to third parties. The risk with respect
to the ownership of the rights therein is imposed upon the
third party. As stated, publicity of the right at the stage of its
crystallization suffices without the owner being deprived of his
rights in a chattel following involuntary loss of possession. It is
not contended that the same legal policy of allocating risks
must necessarily apply to the area of chattels and the area of
trade secrets. Rather, the discussion above demonstrates that
the requirement of publicity of in rem rights does not necessarily pose a preliminary barrier to the in rem concept in the context of trade secrets.72
B. The Onus of Taking Measures to Preserve Secrecy
As mentioned above, it is a well-settled rule of American
trade secrets law that the owner of a trade secret is not entitled to protection unless he has adopted reasonable measures to
protect the secrecy of the information.7" This rule is of special
relevance in a case in which the information's secrecy was actually preserved prior to the misappropriation, while protective
measures were not adopted by the owner or were not reasonable according to the aforementioned rule. Thus, assume that
those coming into contact with the information are aware of the
plaintiffs ownership, and, notwithstanding the non-adoption of
reasonable protective measures, the information is still unpublished. Further assume that the defendant received the information from an employee of the plaintiff knowing that the
information has not yet been published. The aforementioned

71. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.

72. Dean holds a different opinion, according to which the absence of registration
is a critical element in the negation of the in rem status of the right in a trade
secret. "It would be absurd to expect a recipient to trace the origins of information on
each occasion." DEAN, supra note 3, at 84. Dean's argument will be analyzed later in
this article.
73. See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 5, § 1.04.
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rule, imposing an onus of taking protective means as a precondition for protecting the right, would be applicable in such a
situation and would prevent the protection of the owner's rights
according to trade secrets law, although unfair means have
been applied.
The rule imposing an onus of taking protective measures
contributes to the in rem concept regarding trade secrets, as
such onus promotes the publicity of the right. 4 However, the
conclusiveness of the rule and its applicability as a necessary
pre-condition even in situations as described above, in which
the requirement of publicity has been fulfilled notwithstanding
the owner's failure to discharge his duty of taking measures to
preserve secrecy, is not strictly commensurate with the general
context of the in rem model that an owner's title to a tangible
asset cannot be denied due to his failure to adopt appropriate
safeguarding measures. 5 A thief is not heard to claim to the
owner that he, the owner, did not properly guard his property,
thereby justifying an act of conversion. It should be noted that
the onus of taking protective measures in the context of trade
secrecy is not limited to situations in which the defendant acted
while not being aware of the owner's rights in the secret. It applies on a larger scope than that of an estoppel argument. 6
The legal system thereby declares that it will not provide the
trade secret's owner with a protection more solid than he himself provided to his asset.7 This is not the law's approach to
owners of other assets in general.
Nevertheless, this onus may be justified on other grounds
which do not detract from the potential in rem nature of the
right in trade secrets. It may be founded upon the nature of
secrecy itself, which is a conditio sine qua non for the crystallization of the "asset" under discussion, i.e. the right in a trade
secret.7 It may be argued that the "secrecy" concept involves
74. See supra text accompanying note 70.
75. Protection of in rem rights is unconditional, and only concepts like purchase
in good faith for value and "market overt" may sometimes restrict it. See infra notes
143-46 and accompanying text.
76. No rule has been developed under American law. See the general description
at 1 MILGRIM, supra note 5, § 1.04 (conditioning the application of this onus to the
mental state of the defendant, and thus no rule demanding reliance on a representation-as in estoppel-applies).

77. See id.
78. For the "secrecy" requirement, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPF-
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subjective elements in addition to its objective components.
Thus, the fact that there was no actual publication of the information is insufficient for considering it as secret. Where there
is no intention by the owner to maintain secrecy, there can be
no trade secret in legal terms, even if the information has not
become public knowledge. Indeed, English jurisprudence supports this concept. It does not establish a separate independent
rule imposing the onus of taking protective measures, but rather arrives at a similar requirement that the subjective intent of
the owner to keep the information secret be proven.79 The recently published Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
reflects a similar concept as to the significance of the requirement that the owner take precautions. 0
C. Exclusivity
It may be argued that the right in a trade secret is not in
rem, due to the absence of exclusivity which generally characterizes an in rem right.81 Control over tangible assets cannot
be simultaneously applied between disputing parties. A trade
secret, however, may be duplicated and thus simultaneously
controlled by many. As has been contended, information cannot
be "taken", but rather "shared." With the duplication of the
trade secret, the owner loses his exclusivity and advantage but

TITION § 39 cmt. f, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 707 cmt. b; 1 JAGER, supra

note 1, § 50.5[1].
79. See Marshall v. Guinle, 3 W.L.R. 116 (1987); COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 7-8.
In American jurisprudence, the rule has in some cases been formulated as requiring
proof that the owner intended to keep the information secret (instead of determining
a rule establishing the onus of the owner to obtain secrets). See, e.g., Cherne Indus.,
Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMTTION § 39 cmt. g states that:
[wihether viewed as an independent requirement or as an element to be
considered with other factors relevant to the existence of a trade secret,
the owner's precautions should be evaluated in light of the other available evidence relating to the information's value and secrecy. Thus, if the
value and secrecy of the information are dear, independent evidence of
specific precautions by the trade secret owner may not be required.
See also 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 5.05[2][a]. "A strong element of probative proof of
secrecy is created when the trade secret owner has taken steps to ensure the secrecy
of the information." Id. at 131-32.
81. See, ag., Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUT. L. REV. 357
(1954).
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not his "possession." 2 It also may be claimed that since the
owner may continue using the secret contemporaneously with
the misappropriator's use, there is no justification for conferring
the right in trade secrets with protection as vigorous as that
conferred to in rem rights.
This view should be rejected as inaccurate. For in fact, in the
case of a trade secret, no joint control over the same "asset" is
exercised by the owner and the misappropriator. No duplication
of the asset occurs when the trade secret is misappropriated,
rather the trade secret is divided into "parts." Every additional
competitor availing himself of the secret effectively reduces the
value and modifies the characterization of the asset remaining
in the hands of the prior competitor. Prior to misappropriation
only the owner of the trade secret could exploit the information,
while thereafter he is left with a different asset; the information being also exploited by competitors. Thus, the argument
that the same asset is simultaneously controlled by disputing
parties in the context of a trade secret is inaccurate." Furthermore, this argument ignores adjustments to the concepts
prevailing in the field of tangible property, which ought to be
made with regard to the specific and unique features of intellectual property. Even if simultaneous control over the same asset
is applied, this result derives from the abstract nature of intellectual property which allows that phenomena, without indicating the absence of the in rem character of the right.
D. Disappearanceof the Asset
In American jurisprudence it has been argued that the right
in a trade secret is not an in rem right, as in rem rights
cannot just evaporate. Yet, upon the publication of a trade
secret the owner's right expires. "It is indeed a strange form of
'property' that disappears when the information it embraces
becomes public or others independently make the same discov" 84

ery.

82. For discussion on this argument, see Weinrib, supra note 17, at 123-24.
83. The idea of "division" of a trade secret into parts can be found in American
jurisprudence. See COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 48; F.W. Dodge Co. v. Construction
Info. Co., 66 N.E. 204 (Mass. 1903).
84. John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962).
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This argument is clearly unfounded. First, all intellectual
property rights are, by definition, of fixed duration which is one
of the features unique to intellectual property. This feature
represents the attempt to strike a balance between the
individual's interest in attaining reward for his investments and
the public interest demanding that the public be able to benefit
from the advancement achieved after a specified period of
time.'a Once again, this is an argument that denies the special
character of intellectual property.
Second, even with respect to tangible assets, there is always
the possibility that the asset may be destroyed and the rights
therein may expire. Although, this is not a predetermined inherent feature, but rather a possible incidental development.
Indeed, the argument that the possible "expiry" of the trade
secret negates its in rem character has been sharply criticized
in the legal literature. 6
E. Immediacy and Independence of Control
One of the most important features of the in rem right is its
independence and immediacy. There is no need to adopt legal
proceedings in order to establish the benefit and control granted
by the right. The situation is different with respect to an obligatory right concerning an asset which, being more remote in its
character, lacks the feature of immediacy." The obligatory
right applies primarily against a specific person (the debtor)
and the creditor is required to initiate legal proceedings in
order to realize his right."
It would appear that in American law the right in trade
secrets is one in which both the features of immediacy and
independence of control are present. The holder of the information enjoys the right to control and he benefits immediately
from the trade secret without having to rely upon any specific
legal connection with another person." The owner's connection
85. See 1 MILGRM, supra note 5, § 2.01[2].
86. See id; Weinrib, supra note 17, at 127.
87. This difference between in rem and obligatory rights is well explained by the

notion that an obligatory right to reserve an asset is only a "right to a right." See
SALMOND, supra note 22, at 42.
88. For discussion of this characterization see Cohen, supra note 81, at 369-71.
89. In the American law, the right to trade secrecy is protected against un-
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to the trade secret is thus independent; it is unrelated to any
prior legal relationship. This conclusion is clearer in American
jurisprudence than in English jurisprudence, in which the existence of a relationship based on confidentiality or contract is
usually regarded as an essential precondition for establishing
protection."
F. 'Ownership" of the Secret
In legal literature it has been contended that the use of the
term "owner" to describe the holder of a trade secret is inaccurate because the right in a trade secret is not an in rem right:
"although one might loosely describe the person who knows,
and is entitled to use information as the 'owner of the information,' it is arguable that the use of that term is not strictly
correct."91 The assumption underlying this argument is incorrect. Reference to "ownership" of the trade secret does not indicate per se that the rights therein are in rem. It serves only to
indicate the proprietary nature of the right. Although trade secrets can be "owned," an obligatory right can also be owned and
yet obligatory rights are not in rem."2 Consequently, the existence of ownership in the context of trade secrets does not constitute any specific kind of right, and it does not advance the
discussion concerning the in rem nature of the right.
G. Negotiability of the Right in a Trade Secret
Case law and literature frequently assert that the right in a
trade secret is a property right due to the fact that it functions
as an asset. It is negotiable and serves as a subject for other
kinds of dispositions, its sale is subject to capital appreciation
tax, and it may also be bequeathed.93
It has already been stated that the abovementioned description does not lead to a conclusion that the right in a trade sespecified parties, by means of the legal cause of unfair misappropriation, which does
not require any contractual or fiduciary relations. See infra Part V.Ll.a.L

90.
91.
92.
93.

See
See
See
See

Cohen, supra note 81, at 369-71.
COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 30.
DIAS, supra note 2, at 297.
supra Part I.
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cret is an in rem right. It does no more than invite the conclusion that the right in a trade secret is a proprietary right. As
stated above, there is no identity between proprietary rights
and in rem rights." Obligatory rights, too, are assets which
are the subject of dispositions.
H. ConsiderationsRelating to Legal Coherence
The right in a trade secret must be coherently incorporated
within the general scheme of intellectual property. No justification exists for judicially developing a legal institution that extirpates existing laws that are well entrenched in legislation. For
the purposes of this article, the question arises whether in rem
protection (as opposed to weaker forms of protection) for trade
secrecy might lead to the circumvention and uprooting of patent
law.
Granting a right in a patent requires the owner to adopt
registration procedures which involve complete disclosure of the
details of the invention. The period of protection is limited to a
predetermined fixed period. The inventor "pays" the public by
way of disclosing the information, and public use of this information is permitted upon the expiration of the protection period
of the patent. 5 The argument which should be examined is
that providing in rem protection for the right in a trade secret
obviates both the need and interest of the owner in protecting
the given information by way of registering a patent. According
to this argument, the holder of the information can benefit from
a parallel, or even preferable, protection to that offered by patent laws by relying on the law of trade secrets without contributing to the public as required by patent law. 6

94. See supra Part

ml.

95. Trade secrecy laws will not protect the information after the expiration of the
patent, as the trade secret is deemed disclosed and published, to the extent described
in the patent. See 1 MIIGRIM, supra note 5, § 1.06[1].
96. The granting of a patent involves a "quid pro quo" concept; the inventor receives a monopoly for a fixed period, and he contributes to the public by prompt
disclosure of the information, which enables the system "to catalyze other investors
into activity and make possible additional advances in the art." ROSENBERG, supra
note 42, § 1.02.
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Two separate questions may be posed in this context. The
first question, mentioned previously, is whether recognition of
the in rem status of the right in a trade secret obviates the law
of patents. The second question is whether, as a matter of legal
policy, the system should encourage and strengthen the motivation to register a patent, as opposed to alternate methods of
protection, even if the alternatives do not necessarily obviate
patent law.
1. Possible Uprooting of Patent Law
As to the first question, the argument that the law of patents
is liable to become redundant if in rem status is conferred upon
trade secrets has been addressed in the American and English
systems.9 7 However, closer examination indicates the
argument's fallacy. Providing in rem status to the right in a
trade secret does not amount to the granting of a monopolistic
protection. The meaning of in rem protection is that any party
misappropriating the secret from the plaintiff or receiving it
following such misappropriation is subject to the tracing right
of the owner even if he acted innocently." It would still be
necessary to prove that the secret reaching the defendant originated with the plaintiff.9 9 There is, therefore, a basic distinction between the protection granted to the right in a trade
secret, even if determined that the right is in rem, and the
scope of protection granted to a patent. Within the trade secrets
law, independent disclosure, as well as disclosure by reverse
engineering, does not impose liability, whereas independent
discovery by the defendant in patent law is prohibited as
well.' ° Thus, even if in rem protection is to be conferred upon
trade secrets, the added advantage attained by the registration
of the patent remains. There is still a sharp difference between
having "only" an in rem protection, which requires proof of the
misappropriation of the information from the plaintiff, and the

97. For the English law, see DEAN, supra note 3, at 83 (wondering whether trade

secrets being property will affect the Patents Act of 1958). For the American law, see
1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 1.04..

98. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. This, as independent discovery is
not prohibited by trade secrecy laws.
100. See 1 ROSENBERG, supra note 42, § 1.03.
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monopolistic patent defense, which would lead to the total
"blocking" of that knowledge. Where the owner of the information is prepared to pay the aforementioned "price" of disclosing
the information, in order to gain a monopolistic defense, he
would prefer the registration of a patent.
The situation changes when the owner of the information
expects that the secrecy will be maintained for a period exceeding the period of a patent,10' and further assumes that the
chances of independent discovery by another person are low.
Under these circumstances he should assume the risk of the
secret's disclosure and choose the protection offered by the law
of trade secrets. From here it is clear that granting in rem
protection does not render the patent law redundant.0 2 It
should be noted that, in any event, the "redundancy" claim does
not apply to unpatentable information.
A related issue is the issue of preemption. The question is
whether the federal legislation regarding patent law precludes
applicability of trade secrets rules applied by virtue of the common law in the states. The rules of preemption derive from the
principle that when a given right is recognized both in the
federal law and common law, has common foundations in both
systems, as well as common purposes, then the federal arrangement will be the exclusive and binding arrangement*. 3
When the relationship between the patent laws and trade
secrets laws was first examined, the solution offered to this
problem was initially vague, and there were even rulings to the
effect that applicability of the principle of preemption should be
recognized with respect to information relating to inventions.'" Subsequently, in view of the substantial differences in
the respective purposes of the two laws, it was ruled that the
preemption principle does not prevent parallel common-law development of protection for trade secrets.' 5 This indicates that
101. The principal example of a successful anticipation of the future duration of
secrecy is the case of the Coca Cola formula whose secrecy has been preserved for so
many years. See Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. 18 (D. Del.
1985); 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 5.05 [2][a].
102. See 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 1.05; Weinrib, supra note 17, at 148-49.
103. See 2 JAGER, supra note 1, at ch. 10.
104. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
105. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1847 (1989)
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afforded
there
is a "surfeit"
of protection
laws.by the patent law in
comparison
with those
of trade secret
2. Encouraging the Registration of Patents
A second question still remains, namely that of the appropriate legal policy. Should the institution of patents be fortified
through negation of in rem status to inventions within the
trade secrets law? Public interest definitely encourages the
owner of an invention to register a patent, as opposed to situations in which the invention is only protected as a trade secret,
without the public being remunerated by the disclosure of the
information.0 6 Decreased legal protection for trade secrets increases the incentive for owners of information to patent their
knowledge. It may be contended, then, that due to this consideration, in rem protection to the right in a trade secret should
be denied.
We have already noted that resolution of the question of the
in rem nature of a right does not lend itself to purely logical
and structural considerations, but also involves a significant
measure of legal policy.'07 Considerations regarding the encouragement of the institution of patents are therefore of relevance.
Yet, the abovementioned contention should be rejected. First,
trade secrets are not comprised exclusively of inventions, they
also include the whole gamut of non-patentable information." 8
Thus, even assuming the validity of this argument, it would
only apply to part of the trade secrets, and the question remains open with respect to other types of information.
Second, it seems that sufficient incentive still remains for the
holder of the secret information to register a patent, even if
trade secrets were to acquire in rem status. As stated above,
(emphasizing the approach that trade secrets, as opposed to patent law, also involve
an element of protection of privacy). See also Kewanele Oil Co. v. Bicron Co., 416
U.S. 470 (1973) (in which the difference between the two legal institutions has been
founded upon a wider grounding, describing the different incentives that each of the
rights confers upon the entitled party); 2 JAGEI, supra note 1, § 10.011l].
106. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
107. See supra Part IV.
108. See supra note 65.
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the holder of a secret who has not registered a patent exposes
himself to serious danger of losing his rights should the secret
become public. Publication of the secret is an eminent danger in
the typical situation in which the holder is forced to share his
secret with other people, such as employees, in the process of
using the information. Nor is the holder protected from independent discovery, and the granting of in rem protection to the
right does not affect that reality. Furthermore, in the absence
of a patent, the petitioner faces considerable difficulties of
proof, both with respect to the actual act of the misappropriation of the secret, and also with respect to the definition of the
protected elements of the information.'
Finally, society also has an interest, although more limited in
scope, in encouraging development of unpatented "know how."
Such development contributes as well to the social and economic welfare of the public at large."1 Assuming that a sufficiently large gap still exists between in rem protection of secret
information and the monopolistic protection of patents, the
policy aimed at encouraging registration of patents should not
negate an in rem defense to trade secrets if the features of the
right in a trade secret do in fact warrant the granting of such
protection.
I. Absoluteness of the ProtectionAgainst Third Parties
1. The Mental State of Third Parties
a. The Position of American Law
i. Primary infringements
This issue is the kernel of the in rem question. Clearly the
difference between in rem protection and the protection granted
to obligatory rights lies in the "risk factor." 1 ' Any party com109. The patent claim issued within the registration process clearly identifies the
boundaries of the protected information. A similar degree of certainty does not exist
concerning the right of trade secrecy, since the establishment of this right lacks any
formalities.
110. See Bonito Boats, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1853-54; see also 1 JAGER, supra note

1, § 1.04.
111. The basic feature of an in rem right is its being protected against the world
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ing into contact with in rem rights of another is in danger

because if he intrudes on the rights of the true owner he shall
become liable for infringement, albeit without any fault on his
part." With regard to trade secrets, a distinction must be
made between two categories of parties committing infringements. One category is the primary infringement by way of
direct misappropriation of the secret from the holder. The other
is that of a third party who received the secret as a result of
misappropriation, by acquiring the trade secret from the initial
or any subsequent misappropriator. American jurisprudence
recognizes three causes of action concerning initial infringement
of trade secrecy; a contractual cause, a cause based on confidential relations, and cases of unfair misappropriation."' Our
concern in this context is with the third cause. The in rem
character of a right comes into expression with respect to third
parties who are not initially bound by any specific duties such
as contractual or fiduciary ones.

The Restatement (First) of Torts did not clearly address the
question

of

whether

unfair

misappropriation

requires

a

defendant's knowledge (or the possibility of having knowledge)
as to the protected nature of the information. It was clear that
the motivation for the action of the defendant is irrelevant,"'
the emphasis being on the nature of the act itself. Thus, it has
been mentioned that if a person breaks into another person's

drawer in order to steal love letters and it eventuates that the
document also includes a trade secret, the fact that he was not
motivated by the desire to misappropriate the trade secret does
not detract from the unfairness of his act." Yet, it must be
noted that the above example does not indicate the absence of a
legal requirement of fault in order to constitute a cause of action, for there is fault in such a case, even if upon another
object which is not the secret itself. The Restatement (Third) of

at large. See, e.g., SALMOND, supra note 22, at 235; see also Fowler v. Hollins, 7 Q.B.
616, 639 (1872). "Persons deal with the property in chattels or exercise acts of ownership over them at their peril." Id.
112. See DEAN, supra note 3, at 71.
113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38-43 (1995); UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990); 1 MIIGRIM, supra
note 5, § 3.01.
114. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 757 cmt. g (1934).
115. See id.
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Unfair Competition now clarifies that a mental element is indeed required, stating that the improper means should be applied in relation to information that the actor knows or has
reason to know is another person's trade secret."' The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), in contrast, does not necessarily require an element of "mens rea" in all cases. Thus, "misappropriation" includes disclosure or use of a trade secret by a
person who used improper means to acquire knowledge."
"Improper means" include, inter alia, cases in which a person
reached the information by breaching a duty to maintain secrecy." Such a breach might also occur in cases in which the
defendant is not aware of the fact that the given information is
subject to the general duty of confidence which is imposed upon
him towards the owner of the information."
The cause of action due to misappropriation also exists in
favor of the owner of the secret against a third party who applies improper means to obtain .the information, not from the
owner himself, but from any subsequent party who has been
acquainted with the secret.'

116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 40(a) (1995).
117. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(iiXA) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438
(1990).
118. See id. § 1(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.
437 (1990).
119. Yet, the arrangement in the UTSA is not entirely satisfactory in relation to
another aspect. Take a case in which the defendant has not reached the information
through breach of confidence, but the owner of the trade secret voluntarily deposited
it in the defendant's hands. The defendant discloses the secret to another person,
without being aware of the fact that he is breaching his obligation. The relevant
"misappropriation" alternative in the UTSA in such case is section 1(2)(i)(BXf). This
section requires that at the time of disclosure or use the defendant should know or
have reason to know that the secret was acquired under circumstances giving rise to
a duty to maintain secrets. An awareness of the breach is not required, yet the demand that the defendant shall be aware of the fact that he is under obligation of
confidence in relation to the specific information, is quite problematic. If according to
the "internal" laws of confidence, such awareness is not required, misappropriation of
the secret should establish a cause of action in this case, even if the defendant
lacked awareness of the breach.
120. Thus, section 1(2)(iiXA) defines as "misappropriation" cases in which a person
"used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret." This definition does
not relate any importance to the question from whom did he acquire the knowledge.
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMION § 40(a) (1995).
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ii. Secondary Infringements
A second category of cases are those in which the third party
himself did not perform an unlawful act of misappropriation,
but received the secret from a person responsible for the initial
breach or from any subsequent party. The question is whether
the receipt, use, or transfer of such information constitutes a
cause of action against such party, and upon what terms.
In American jurisprudence, the well established rule is that a
right of tracing arises in favor of the owner of the secret,
against a third party who knew or ought to have known that
the secret came into his knowledge as a result of a misappropriating act."2 The expansion of the tracing right against
those parties that ought to have known of the misappropriation,
and not only to those who actually knew, is of particular importance. In most of the cases the owner of the trade secret is not
in a position to prove the existence of actual knowledge and
without such expansion of the tracing right the protection offered by trade secrets law would be frustrated. Quite frequently
the dispute arises when the secret is transferred by a previous
employee of the owner of the secret to his new employer who
naturally is aware of the identity of the previous employer and
his area of activity. Thus, he should often be aware of the possibility that the knowledge in the possession of the employee
originated with the previous employer, even though he had no
actual knowledge of it.
Despite the abovementioned expansion of the tracing right, if
tracing is limited to cases in which third parties had actual or
constructive knowledge, the right in trade secrets ought not to
be classified as an in rem right because in rem rights are fully
operational against third parties.' Thus, even good faith of a
third party, both objective and subjective, will be of no avail
against the owner of an in rem right.

121. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.LA. 438 (1990) (Defi-

nition of "misappropriation"); see also Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods Ltd., 941
F.2d 970, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1991); Wright v. Palmer, 464 P.2d 363, 366 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1970); 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 3.04 [8].
122. See supra notes 111-12.
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A closer examination of the tracing rule with respect to trade
secrets, as developed by American jurisprudence, indicates the
existence of two trends which initially differed sharply, but
have tended to converge over recent years. In the past, the case
law tended to prescribe that the good faith purchase of a trade
secret for value or any significant change in the situation of the
third party while still acting in good faith, relying upon the
trade secret, will normally release him from being subject to
the rights of the owner, even if the owner later notifies him
about his rights.' Originally, the Restatement stated that it
is "fairer and more consistent with the general principles underlying the protection of the interests in trade secrets to permit him (the innocent third party) to enjoy the expectancies of
his investment."' Yet, the Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Unfair Competition, adopts a harder line towards an innocent
purchaser, and it also subjects an innocent purchaser to
liability.' Misappropriation occurs even when a third party
only becomes aware of the infringement of trade secrecy at the
time of the use. 6 Yet, the innocent third party may find relief within the remedial framework. As to injunctions, section
44(2) states that while applying its discretionary power concerning injunctive relief, the court shall consider, inter alia,
"the relative harm likely to result to the legitimate interests of
the defendant if an injunction is granted."' Undoubtedly, innocent acquisition by the defendant constitutes a "legitimate
interest" to be considered.' As far as monetary relief is concerned, its appropriateness and measure is described as discretionary, while the court should take into consideration "the
intent and knowledge of the actor and the nature and extent of
any good faith reliance by the actor."'

123. See id. § 758; 2 MILGRIM, supra note 5, § 702[2][d].
124. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 758 cmt. e (1934).
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrITION § 1.01(4) (1995). Milgrim
suggests a careful approach to this Restatement in describing the case law.

126. See id. § 40(b).
127. Id. § 44(2Xd).
128. 1 MILGRIM, supra note 5, § 1.0114] n.69. Milgrim wonders whether a willful
misappropriator might be viewed as having "legitimate interests." Id. An innocent one
certainly does.
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETIION § 45(2)(d) (1995).
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It can be concluded, then, that the current Restatement rejects the granting of total immunity to the innocent purchaser,
but courts are still provided with wide discretion to assist the
innocent purchaser while considering the remedy issue. Clearly,
both the UTSA and the case law following its publication significantly influenced the formulation of the current Restatement
on this key issue.
The position adopted in the UTSA sharply differs from the
position that prevailed in the Restatement (First) of Torts.
According to the UTSA, the innocent third party is not
privileged with any a priori immunity, as a result of the change
in his situation. In principle, a tracing right against the third
party who received the secret is established even when he did
not know, nor should he have known, of the conflicting rights
when he acquired the secret. It is sufficient that the third party
continued to use the secret in awareness of the existence of
previous rights in the secret in order for him to be subject to
the right of tracing."' A different interpretation which has
been offered in respect of this provision should be rejected."'

130. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2XiiXB) (amended 1985), 14 U.LA 438
(1990) (stating that the defendant is liable if he knew, or could have known, about
the existence of the competing rights at the time of disclosure or use, meaning also
after he had acquired the trade secret). The 1985 revised version did not amend
section 1. See also the Commissioners' Comments to section 2(b):
This notice suffices to make the third party a misappropriator thereafter
under section 1(2Xii) B(I) ....
With respect to innocent acquirers of
misappropriated trade secrets, section 2(b) is consistent with the principle
of 4 Restatement Torts (First) § 758(b) (1939), but rejects the
Restatement's literal conferral of absolute immunity upon all third parties
who have paid value in good faith for a trade secret misappropriated by
another.
131. See COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 50. "It would seem from section 1(2Xc) of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act that a material change of position by an innocent third
party may amount to a defence under that Act, but there is no specific mention of
bona fide purchase." Id. Yet, section 1(2)(iiXc) is an independent alternative of "misappropriation7 which is relevant in a situation in which there is no other alternative.
It therefore deals with a situation in which initially there was no illegal misappropriation or transfer of the secret, but rather it mistakenly came into the defendant's
control (for example, where the owner of the secret mistakenly transferred a secret to
an incorrect fax number). But in a case in which the secret has originally been taken
from the control of the owner of the information without his consent, it is sufficient
under the provisions of section 1(2Xii)(B) of the UTSA, that awareness of the competing rights was present while using it, and not at the time of receiving the information.
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In the remedial arena, an important development occurred in
1985. According to the original version of the UTSA published
in 1979, the court had discretion to deny injunctive relief "if the
court determines that it would be unreasonable to prohibit
future use," conditioning future use upon payment of "reasonable royalty."' 2 The Commissioner mentioned the case of an
innocent purchaser as a typical case in which denial of injunctive relief might be appropriate, further stating that in such
situations "the same considerations that render a prohibitory
injunction against future use inappropriate also render a royalty order injunction inappropriate."' 3 The 1895 version of section 2 states that injunctive relief may be denied, substituting
injunction with payment of a reasonable royalty in "exceptional
circumstances."' It further prescribes that "exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable."' 5
In general terms one may conclude that there are no meaningful modifications in the revised version regarding the status
of an innocent purchaser. Yet, some nuances should not be
overlooked. On the one hand, the innocent purchaser is now
explicitly mentioned in section 2.136 On the other hand, the
revised version refers now only to exceptional circumstances.' A material and prejudicial change of position is required, indicating that a substantial preliminary onus is now
imposed upon the innocent third party. Obviously, such change
of position does not suffice per se, serving only to trigger the
consideration of the situation as a whole and the equities of the
case. Although the referred change of position is included under
"exceptional circumstances," according to section 2, the use of
such wording may be interpreted as an indication that a court
should apply its discretion to deny injunctive relief only in a
limited manner, even in cases of innocent change of position.

132. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 2(b) (1979), 14 U.LA. 449 (1990).
133. Id. § 2 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 451 (1990).

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. § 2(b) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 449 (1990).
Id.
See id.
See id.
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Indeed, the difference between "exceptional circumstances" in
the 1985 version and "unreasonableness" in the 1979 version is
not a dramatic one, but it should be considered carefully. Thus,
the question of whether or not the revised version should be
viewed as taking a harder line towards the interests of innocent
third parties concerning injunctive relief is quite ambiguous.
Concerning monetary relief, the 1985 version of the UTSA
alleviates the risks imposed on the innocent purchaser." It
prescribes that "[e]xcept to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery
inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for
misappropriation." 9 The 1979 version did not include any
provision to this effect. Although section 3 of the 1979 version
mentioned that the plaintiff "may" recover damages, and although the Commissioner has mentioned the case of an innocent third party relying on the information, as a case in which
monetary relief may be denied under this provision,' this interpretation is doubtful. In general, the remedy of damages is
not a discretionary one, and the right of an injured party to
recover the greater of his damages or the misappropriator's
profit is obligatory. 4' As to the future, when the court decides
to substitute the injunctive relief with the payment of a royalty
according to section 2(b) of the UTSA, the very use in the future becomes lawful, and no right to damages emerges in relation to this period. Yet, being limited only to the use made
after the judicial decree, this discretion does not relate to the
use in the past.
It may be concluded, then, that the 1985 version of the
UTSA provides a discretionary mechanism which increases the
protection granted to innocent third parties concerning monetary relief. While case law has over the years developed a
harsher approach toward innocent third parties, the UTSA
became more lenient in this respect, both patterns now implementing a discretionary model. The questions still remain,

138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. § 3 (amended 1985), 14 U.LA 455 (1990).
Id.
See id. § 3 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.LA 456 (1990).
See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 5, § 1.03[2][a] n.26.
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whether this model is desirable, and how the court should apply its discretion.
The relevance of the above mentioned issue is far reaching.
Usually, the third party will not receive the secret without
paying consideration for it, or without some other kind of reliance on his part, in order to adjust his business to the advantages of the information that he has acquired. If it is sufficient
that the third party becomes aware of the contrary rights at
any later stage, the upshot would be that the third party is
being exposed to risks close to those which are imposed by in
rem rights. Reliance in good faith would not necessarily be
protected.
It should be remembered that the claim of good faith purchase for value does not normally serve as a good defense for a
third party in those situations where he is confronted with an
in rem right.' In American law, good faith purchase for value usually only prevails over obligatory rights.' While, with
respect to prior in rem rights, this system rejects the institution
of "market overt"' that applies in English law.' Yet, the
market overt institution applies in the English law only with
respect to tangible assets and it does not protect the purchaser
of an abstract asset, such as a trade secret.'"
From this it emerges that, notwithstanding a mistaken opinion that has been mentioned in this respect,'47 the fact that a
given system limits its protection to third parties "only" to
cases in which the third party has purchased the secret bona
fide and for value does not indicate the existence of an in rem
nature. Rather, the opposite is the case. In order to overcome
the in rem right in English law, good faith purchase for value
does not suffice. The purchaser must establish the application
of "market overt" elements.'

142. This general rule is subject to some exceptions. See DONAHUE, JR., ET AL,

supra note 67, at 44.
143. See Menachem Mautner, -The Eternal Triangles of the Law: Toward a Theory
of Prioritiesin Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95 (1991).
144. Id. at 150; see also DONAHUE, JR., ET AL., supra note 67, at 44.
145. Sale of Goods Act, 1979, ch.54, § 22 (Eng.).
146. DEAN, supra note 3, at 84.
147. F. GURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 265-66 (1984).

148. See Sale of Goods Act, 1979, ch. 54, § 22 (Eng).
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It should be noted that, in relation to the remedy of damages
as opposed to an injunction order, significant importance attaches to the rule that liability imposed on the third party is on
the basis of knowledge. The interim period between the receiving of the secret by the defendant and the discovery of the illegality may be a long period, and during this period the defendant is immune from damages. During this period no substantial liability is imposed in the absence of knowledge, and thus
no remedy emerges.'
Thus, liability for the breach of the
right in a trade secret deviates from the regular in rem rule
which also imposes an obligation for damages upon innocent
third parties.'
In summation, the defense of the right in trade secrets under
American law is hybrid in nature. On the one hand, the protection of trade secrets is more vigorous than that granted to
obligatory rights, in as much as parties acting in good faith and
acquiring the information for value are liable to be affected in
appropriate circumstances."5 On the other hand, the features
of the right in a trade secret do not fully amount to those
characterizing in rem rights. As stated earlier, in rem rights
are characterized by the absence of any consideration being
given to the mental state of the misappropriator." 2 It may,
therefore, be concluded that to the extent that the discussion
relates to the mental state of third parties, the view of the
American law is that the right in a trade secret should be
placed in an intermediate category located somewhere between
in rem rights and obligatory rights. The nature of this intermediate category shall be examined below.
b. The Position of English and Australian Law
An examination of Australian and English law regarding the
status of bona fide purchasers of a trade secret reveals contra-

149. See supra text accompanying notes 121 & 130.
150. See SALMOND & HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 106 (RF.V. Heuston & R-A.
Buckley eds., 21st ed. 1996).
151. Namely, in circumstances where such party became aware of the misappropriation after acquiring the information, and the court does not apply its discretion in

his favor.
152. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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dictory decisions. This article will avoid the re-examination of
the case law in view of Dean's instructive analysis." This author endorses Dean's opinion that the abovementioned systems
allow the tracing of the right in a trade secret even against
bona fide third parties according to equitable considerations.
Dean does not view this conclusion as supporting the in rem
thesis concerning trade secrets, but rather as a consequence of
the general flexibility of the equitable remedy which enables
granting of appropriate remedies against third parties whose
rights derive from a party committing breach of confidence.'"
The rules developed in the English and Australian law are as
follows: (1) A third party who knew or ought to have known at
the time of his receiving the information that the transferor is
under breach of confidence becomes liable to the owner of the
secret;' (2) a third party who neither knew nor should have
known of the breach of confidence at the time of receiving the
trade secret, but did not change his situation in reliance upon
the secret, will be subject to the tracing right of the owner of
the secret;' s and (3) a third party who had no actual or constructive knowledge at the time of receiving the trade secret
and changed his situation in reliance thereupon would be liable
to the owner of the information as a matter of discretion, according to the circumstances in general, taking into consideration the losses to be incurred by either side and other equitable considerations. 7 Thus, the very fact that the defendant is.
a bona fide purchaser will not necessarily be sufficient to excuse him from liability."
153. See DEAN, supra note 3, at ch. 5.
154. See id. at 256-57.
155. See Schering Chem. Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 848 (1981); Ansell Rubber
Co. Pty Ltd. v. Allied Rubber Indus. Pty Ltd., R.P.C. 811 (1972); GrRRY, supra note
147, at 274; COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 49; DEAN, supra note 3, at 258-62.
156. See Fraser v. Evans, 1 Q.B. 349, 361 (1969); Talbot v. General Television Co.
Pty Ltd., V.R. 224, 240 (1980).
157. See DEAN, supra note 3, at- 267-72. It seems that Dean would assume that
knowledge attained at a later stage would still not necessarily impose liability on the
third party even in the absence of detrimental reliance. Rather, this would be one of
the considerations within the equitable framework. Id. at 267. Yet, the case law and
Dean's discussion mentioning the balance of prejudice between the parties as the
central test, make it clear that in the absence of detrimental reliance (which would
obviously also include cases where consideration was given), the defendant would at
least usually be prevented from continued use of the information since reliance,
serves as the central equitable consideration.
158. See DEAN, at 268-70. Nevertheless, the opinion has been raised that a bona
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When comparing the English and American systems concerning the status of a an innocent third party who has changed
his position in reliance on the trade secret, an important difference emerges. The American system seems to adopt a more
rigid approach in relation to the third party. The considerations
affecting the third party's liability are quite similar in both
systems. Even so, the conceptual basis is different and this
affects the results. In American law, the right of tracing is the
rule, even if there was reliance in good faith. Liability itself
emerges notwithstanding innocence, while consideration of the
third party's interests is shifted to the remedial phase. According to the English equitable approach, on the other hand, the
very liability of the third party depends upon equitable considerations, the tendency being to frequently provide absolute
protection to the bona fide purchaser.
As to the extent to which a court should apply its discretion
in favor of the innocent third party in the American system,
the answer is derived from the appropriate concept to be elaborated in relation to the in rem character of the right in a trade
secret.
2. Acts Constituting Misappropriation
The in rem right is characterized not only by its absolute
applicability in terms of the identity and the mental state of
the parties subject to the right, but also by its absoluteness in
terms of the acts which constitute misappropriation. 9 In the
in rem context, no importance attaches to the specific manner
in which the asset was misappropriated.

fide purchasing would suffice. See GURRY, supra note 147, at 283-84. See also Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), 3 ALL E.R. 545, 596 (1988);
BREARLY & BLOCH, supra note 62, at 76. Yet, the exhaustive and precise analysis by

Dean indicates that no sweeping protection is provided for the bona fide purchaser.
For a discussion of the complexity of this issue, see also COLEMAN, supra note 3, at

49-50.
159. This is subject to special defenses which may be available in a given system
when the third party had purchased a conflicting right in good faith, according to the
"market overt" rule. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.

In the field of torts, the acts which may be seen as conversion include a wide
range of cases. See SALMOND & HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 150, at
98-103; W. PAGE PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15
(5th ed. 1984).
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Yet, in relation to the right in a trade secret, the undisputed
rule in both the English and American systems is that if the
defendant becomes aware of the secret by way of reverse engineering he has not breached the right to secrecy.' The holder of the secret must base his claim on an unfair misappropriation of the secret.'" 1 There may indeed be cases in which the
third party, having purchased the secret from another person,
will be liable to the owner even if there was no direct unfair
misappropriation on his part. However, in such cases there
would have to be a situation in which, at least at the primary
appropriation, unfair means have been applied and the defendant knew or ought to have known of them. Thus, the question
arises as to whether or not the absence of absoluteness with
respect to the manner of the primary appropriation does in fact
negate the in rem nature of the right. It is, therefore, of initial
importance to examine the situations in which appropriation
ought to be considered "unfair."
According to the UTSA, "misappropriation" includes a variety
of unfair conduct which is not necessarily illegal, including, for
example, electronic spying.' Also included are situations in
which the secret was mistakenly lost by the owner and came
into the possession of another person who knew or had reason
to know of the mistake, but used the secret without the express
or implied consent of the owner."8
In fact, primary unconsented appropriation of the trade secret
would usually occur while an element of fault is present. In
order to overcome the owner's precautions, the defendant would
have to take measures such as bribery, misrepresentation or
espionage, which necessarily involve an element of fault. Thus,
in such cases, the requirement for fault does not actually add a
meaningful legal requirement. Indeed, it is possible that primary infringement would occur as a result of a breach of duty of
160. For the American law, see Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th
Cir. 1982); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a. See also 1 MILGRAM, supra
note 5, § 1.05[F]; 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 5.0413][a][i]. For the English law see

COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 40-41.
161. In the American law this rule is explicitly prescribed by section 1 of the
UTSA and section 757 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS. See also 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 5.04 [3][a].

162. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).
163. See id. § 1(2XiiXC) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
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confidence, while the defendant is not aware of the fact that
the duty of confidence applies to the given information. But in
such cases, the existence of a mental element should not necessarily serve as a prerequisite to imposing liability upon the
defendant. 164
The Commissioner specified five situations of discovery of the
secret by a third party that would fall into the category of "fair
means." 1 5 They include (1) independent discovery; (2) reverse
engineering; (3) discovery with the consent of the owner; (4)
discovery by means of a publically sold product; and (5) discovery through professionally published literature.'
Among the situations specified above, the only one relevant
to the analysis of the in rem issue is that of reverse engineering. The first situation is one in which there was no appropriation of information from the plaintiff, and thus, by definition no
claim can be established even if the in rem nature of the right
in trade secrets should be recognized. The third situation, dealing with consent on the part of the owner, is self-explanatory.
Even if the right to secrecy is an in rem right, there is nothing
to prevent the owner of an in rem right from giving an effective
consent which would justify the defendant's action. With regards to the fourth situation, it is not substantially different
from that of reverse engineering. The fifth situation is one in
which there is, in effect, no secret because according to the
given assumption, there was publication and publication abrogates the right in a trade secret.' 1 It thus emerges that the
principal situation legitimating appropriation is reverse engineering. The question is whether this legitimation is commensurate with an in rem conception of the right in a trade secret.

164. Thus, lack of fault does not per se free a trustee from liability under the

English law, although the court has discretionary power to relieve a trustee of liability if he has acted honestly and reasonably. See S.G. RIDDAL, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
345 (3d ed. 1987). In American law, no actual fault is required and a trustee might
become liable in some cases even if he has not been negligent. See 3 WILLIAM F.
FRATCHER, SCrr ON TRUSTS 220 (4th ed. 1988).
165. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985),
(1990).

166. See id.
167. See supra note 62.

14 U.L.A.

438
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Indeed, this general limitation to the protection of the owner
of the trade secret poses a serious difficulty for the acceptance
of the in rem approach. It would, nonetheless, seem that the
difficulty is not insurmountable and can be reconciled with the
in rem concept in the following manner.
The in rem right is likely to conflict with other basic rights,
and in such case a balance must be struck between these competing rights. It may be claimed that reverse engineering is one
of those cases in which the in rem right of the owner of the
secret is in conflict with the freedom of occupation of the party
performing reverse engineering and with his in rem right in the
tangible article from which he derived the information. Economic liberty is also a constitutionally recognized basic right.1"
When an in rem right retreats in the face of a conflicting basic
right, this does not per se expunge its in rem nature. What we
have in effect is a "normal" process of balancing between conflicting values according to their respective importance.
This argument, however, is not entirely satisfactory. A distinction should be made between a case in which the right
being claimed as in rem retreats only in a limited manner in
the face of a conflicting value, and a case in which the retreat
is total to the extent that it empties the in rem right of its
basic content. Does the principle allowing reverse engineering
severely impinge upon the absolute nature of the right in a
trade secret, to the extent of uprooting its in rem nature? I
submit that it does not.
The absence of absoluteness of protection of the right in a
trade secret, in terms of the modes of prohibited behavior, is
the result of a clear distinction that emerges between intellectual property, and tangible property. Intellectual property is less
absolute, by nature, than tangible property. Consideration for
public interest lies at the heart of the laws of intellectual property, and it imposes limitations on the absoluteness of the defense.' In the first place, the right of intellectual property is
granted for the public benefit, a concept which has gained ex-

168. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 407 (1993); OTIs M.
STEPHENSON, JR., ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 10 (1993).

169. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
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plicit recognition in the American Constitution. 17 Conflicting
public interest in encouraging competition, freedom of speech
and freedom of occupation vigorously apply against the interest
of the owner of the trade secret. These interests do not enjoy
the same intensity in the confrontation with tangible property.
The influence of the opposing public interest is particularly
apparent in certain areas. It has already been noted that the
failure to utilize intellectual property may lead to compulsory
licenses or to the blocking of the owner's claims.' A monopoly which is naturally prone to be detrimental to the public
interest should not be granted unless use is made of the intellectual property. Intellectual property rights are not granted
only in order to block others. An additional example of competing public interest is the limited duration of intellectual property, a limitation which does not exist in the area of tangible
The intense influence of public interest considerproperty.'
ations is particularly evident in the field of copyright.'.' Public interest is at the heart of the matter, namely in relation to
the basic distinction between an idea, which is not protected,
and the manner of its expression, which is protected. It has
already been correctly stated that the delicate distinction between idea and expression is not just a logical-structural one,
but rather touches upon the proper demarcation between the
interests of the individual and the public.7 Furthermore, varied defenses are provided to the infringer, particularly the defense of "fair use," which attempts to balance the interests of
the owner and those of the public. 75 Despite all of the above,
no dispute exists as to the in rem nature of copyright.
From this discussion it can be inferred that, when taking
into account the special features characterizing intellectual
property, which are not identical to those of tangible property,
the legitimacy conferred upon the appropriation of a trade se170. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
171. See supra note 42.
172. For the limited duration of patents, see supra note 8. For the duration of
Copyright, see 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.15. Ownership in tangible property is
unlimited in period. See SALMoND, supra note 22, at 247.
173. See, for example, the defense of "fair use" in the American law. 2 GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 9, at ch. 10.
174. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, § 2:3.
175. See COPINGER & JAMES, supra note 9, at ch. 10.
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cret by way of reverse engineering does not necessarily divest
the right in a trade secret of its in rem nature. Admittedly, it
does weaken the intensity of the right, but the same applies to
other forms of intellectual property which enjoy varying degrees
while still retaining their in rem characterizaof protection
176
tion.
At this juncture it is important to add that, notwithstanding
the unassailed rule permitting reverse engineering within the
laws of trade secrets, the question remains as to the desirability of this rule to the extent that it allows the commercial use of
the secret by the defendant as opposed to the discovery of the
information and the personal use thereof. In this context, the
possibility of exposing information by way of reverse engineering does not necessarily lead to the expiry of the right in a
trade secret. This is so because information attained by way of
heavy investment of time and money is not regarded as information that has been published. 7 Thus, information may be
deemed as secret, although it may have been exposed by reverse engineering. From the moment that a person sells a product containing the elements of the trade secret, the freedom of
property of the purchaser dictates that the purchaser be allowed to examine the asset as he sees fit and use the information contained therein for his personal use. But a distinction
can be made between personal use and commercial use. Why

176. Thus, for example, it is undisputed that copyright is an in rem right notwith-

standing the broad defense of "fair use."
177. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. The case law prescribes
that secrecy exists when the information "is not generally known or readily ascertainable." See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979);
Vekamaf Holland B.V. v. Pipe Benders, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 955 (1981); 1 JAGER, supra
note 1, § 3.04.
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f.

The rule stated in this Section requires only secrecy sufficient to confer
an actual or potential economic advantage on one who possesses the

information. Thus, the requirement of secrecy is satisfied if it would be
difficult or costly for others who could exploit the information to acquire
it without resort to the wrongful conduct prescribed under section 40.
Id.
In the English law "relative secrecy" is sufficient. See COLEMAN, supra note 3,
at 5-6. A number of variations are applied in the English law regarding the degree of
knowledge, or possibility of attaining knowledge by others, which would be sufficient
in order to remove the protection from the information. See DEAN, supra note 3, at
129.
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should commercial use be permitted to the extent that it involves the appropriation of the fruits of the labor of the owner
of the secret? Does this really constitute fair competition? As
mentioned above, one of the justifications for the protection of
secret commercial
information is the prevention of unfair com78
petition.

The answer to this issue requires examination of the precise
justification for the rule allowing reverse engineering. One opinion is that it is intended to encourage the owner of the information to choose the option of registration of a patent. This
view is subject to the abovementioned criticism that even
without reverse engineering, there would still be a substantial
incentive for preferring the patent option since the right to
patent also prevents the independent discovery of the information. Another argument is that reverse engineering must be
permitted to allow competitors to be aware of the current state
of knowledge, and to be able to develop other competing products. This argument is also not convincing. Its implication is
only that disclosure of the information by the competitor must
be permitted for the sake of additional development, and not
that the commercial use of the information should be permitted
in a way imitating the information without subjecting it to
further development. Within the positive law, the undisputed
legal reality is that reverse engineering is largely permitted.
Yet, from a conceptual point of view, which is of relevance for
the purpose of this article, it indicates that reverse engineering
is not so readily understandable as it would first seem and as
it has indeed been understood. Thus, the freedom of appropriation of a trade secret through fair means indeed weakens the in
rem concept of trade secrets, but it does not necessarily negate
such a concept if it is to be inferred according to the features
analyzed above.

178. See supra Part IV.
179. See 1 JAGER, supra note 1, § 5.0413][a][i].
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VI. CONCLUSION: Is THE RIGHT IN A TRADE SECRET AN
IN REM RIGHT?

So far the variety of features normally typifying in rem
rights, and their application to the right in a trade secret, have
been examined. Many of the features analyzed above may be
commensurate with the in rem concept, yet, these features are
not exclusive to the in rem right but are common to proprietary
rights in general. This applies mainly to the negotiability of the
right to a trade secret, and its functioning as an asset. Regarding the onus imposed upon the owner to take precautions to
preserve confidentiality, this feature is problematic in the in
rem context even though it may be explained as part of the
notion of secrecy. Moreover, this onus serves as a means for
establishing the publicity of the right in a trade secret, which is
essential to the in rem concept. 80 The right in a trade secret
also fills the important condition for an in rem right, that of
the immediacy of the control over the right. Yet, the most important question concerns the absoluteness of the right, in
terms of the mental state of third parties and the kind of actions that would breach the right to secrecy. We have concluded
that even though the kinds of actions that may breach the
right, thereby imposing liability, are not exactly parallel in
their scope to the actions enjoined by the regular rules protecting in rem rights in general, this scope fits the concept of intellectual property. The main thrust of the question relates to the
weight to be ascribed to the mental element which is required
in order to establish a breach of the right in a trade secret.
With respect to the American law, to the extent that a primary misappropriation of the secret is concerned, the nature of
the mental state required to constitute a breach is not totally
clear. It appears that it is not necessary that the defendant
have knowledge that he is infringing upon the right in a trade
secret.' 8 ' With respect to a third party who received the secret

180. See supra Part V.B.
181. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPrITIoN indeed demands a mental
element. Yet, it relates to the knowledge that the information is a trade secret, and
not to the knowledge about the infringement of rights. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETIION § 40(a) (1995). The UTSA does not necessarily require any ele-
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from another, the approach of the American law is close to the
in rem position. Although it requires either actual or constructive knowledge on behalf of the third party with regard to injunctions, this requirement does not per se detract from the in
rem concept. In any case an injunction order relates to the
future, and the defendant becomes aware of the order, as he is
a party to the proceedings. The main point is that, according to
the American system, it is sufficient that there is knowledge
after the act of appropriation, even if there was a change of
situation in good faith, in order to subject the third party to the
remedy. In this respect, the American system provides wide
protection to the right in a trade secret. Yet, the remedy is
subject to the court's discretion. It is this element that distances the nature of the protection from that granted to the typical
in rem right.
Furthermore, with respect to damages, the requirement of
knowledge of the third party as a condition for his being subject to this remedy prima facie may prejudice acceptance of the
in rem concept to a greater degree than stated above. In effect,
this requirement grants the third party total immunity until
such time as he becomes aware of the misappropriation, in
addition to the discretionary immunity for the period thereafter.
From here it may be argued that prima facie, the model of
protection is not commensurate in this important respect with
the in rem model.
It must be noted, however, that the issue of damages is less
critical for the in rem concept than would first appear from the
discussion above. First, the desirability of the no-fault rule for
proprietary torts is questionable. Although this is still the rule,
there are those who maintain that it should be limited in
scope. 82 Second, with respect to the intellectual property of
copyright, the Anglo-American law provides some consideration,
although extremely limited, of good faith as a factor weighing
in the purchaser's favor in the assessment of damages where

ment of mens rea at all. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(A) (amended 1985),
14 U.L. 438 (1990).
182. See CLERK & LINSELL ON TORTS 669-70 (17th ed. 1995). For exceptions to the
strict liability in British law, see CLERK & LINSELL, at 671. For rejection of strict
liability regarding proprietary torts in American law, see FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.41 (3d ed. 1996).
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there is a lack of sufficient publicity of the right. Still, this
consideration does not detract from the in rem characterization
of copyright. A problem as to the element of publicity also exists with respect to trade secrets, as no registration is possible
concerning such information, although, as mentioned above,
other elements of publicity do exist. While the immunity granted to innocent parties regarding damages does indeed weaken
the in rem concept concerning trade secrets, a central element
characterizing in rem rights remains intact regarding the right
in a trade secret. Purchasing in good faith for value does not
necessarily confer the purchaser with immunity from the time
of his becoming aware of the prior rights. This is not the case
with a third party whose rights are confronting a purely obligatory right. It is in this sense that the right in a trade secret
can be said to be an in rem right.
In summary, it can be concluded that in American law the
features of the right in trade secrets are rather close, yet not
identical to those characterizing in rem rights. The English law,
however, generally denies the in rem nature of the right in a
trade secret, and provides a cause of action against innocent
third parties on an equitable basis.1" Care must be taken to
avoid the "vicious circle" mentioned by Dean.' The issue of
the scope of the tracing right against third parties in the context of trade secrets has yet to be definitively resolved in the
Anglo-American system. There is also no solid consensus on
this issue, although the approaches of the UTSA and the case
law have become more coherent. The intensity with which the
court should apply its discretion in favor of the innocent third
party should be governed by general jurisprudential considerations. Legal literature, as noted above, is not unanimous in regard to this question. In a way, the tracing issue still "awaits"
the resolution of the in rem question. The viewpoint adopted on
the question of the desirable approach to the classification of
the right in a trade secret will also resolve the tracing question,
and we cannot put the horse before the cart. Until this occurs,
the provisional conclusion of the analysis of the features currently attributed to the right in a trade secret indicates that

183. See supra text accompanying note 154.
184. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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the possibility of seeing it as an in rem right cannot be negated. Structurally speaking, there is a possible suitability of the
features of the right in a trade secret with the features normally associated with an in rem right. This conclusion is important, as it constitutes a necessary, but not sufficient condition
to any conclusion that the right in a trade secret is an in rem
right. Yet, the very possibility of classification as in rem does
not mean that such a classification is desirable. The question is
basically one of legal policy. The desirable strength of the right
in a trade secret must be assessed against other conflicting
interests.
Clearly, trade secrets are business assets of the first degree,
and as such, warrant appropriate legal protection. The trade
secret is an asset in which the business makes major investments. Damages of immense magnitude are sustained by owners of trade secrets whose rights have been infringed.'"
The purchaser of a tangible asset exposes himself to the risk
that he has infringed the in rem rights of another person, and
he is subject to the rights of his predecessor. Is there any reason why the situation should differ with respect to information?
Dean notes that "[t]here is no market place (overt) for information, no registration system possible, and it would be absurd to
expect a recipient to trace the origin of information on each
occasion... "186 Prior thereto, he stated more sharply that

[plublic policy is against creating property in trade secrets.
To confer property status to initially confidential information without the need to publish would lock up the information and undermine the Patents Act. To do so would be like
burning books-everybody loses, because information pervades everything we do. If for information to remain status
of property it must remain confidential, there is little advantage to be gained."'
It would be proper to analyze both of these important statements which touch upon the heart of the in rem issue. Regarding the first statement, obliging the third party to trace the

185. See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 3, at 84.
186. DEAN, supra note 3, at 84.
187. DEAN, supra note 3, at 83-84.
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source of information is not as absurd as is claimed. Needless
to say, it is not always possible for the third party to discharge
this onus. But this problem is endemic to all chattels purchased
by a person without the possibility of establishing its source.
Nonetheless, the receiver still assumes a risk with respect to
the nature of the rights he has acquired. Thus, the absence of
registration of the rights does not detract from the possible
justification for the in rem theory. The publicity required according to the jurisprudential principles relates to the moment
at which the right crystallizes. From then on, despite possible
unconsented transfers of the asset, the rights of the original
owner are protected. While it is correct that the English law for
movables occasionally allows third parties to claim "market
overt," nonetheless, if as a matter of principle, in rem protection for trade secrets is desirable, then the correct solution
would be not to reject the in rem status of trade secrets because of the lack of an acknowledged institution of "market
overt." Rather, the correct solution is to accept it, and develop
within the English system a special "market overt" mechanism
for protection of a party who has purchased the information
from a person trading in the information.
With respect to Dean's second statement, rejection of the in
rem status of a trade secret rests upon two tenets. The first
relates to the circumvention of patent law. This article referred
to that argument above, and refuted it.1" The second tenet is
central to the issue under discussion. Does the in rem view of
the right in a trade secret subject the infringing party to an
unlimited and exaggerated risk, in as much as any use made of
information will be fraught with risk? Using information attained from another is a widespread practice, and granting in
rem protection to trade secrets may well lead to undesirable
risks.
In response, one must again mention the structure of the
right in a trade secret. There can be no right in a trade secret
unless the information is unpublished, within the meaning of
the term "publication" in the law of trade secrets. Thus, if the
information is not public knowledge, the receiver of the information has a "warning sign." He is aware, or at least should

188. See supra Part V.H.1.
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be, that if the information is not public knowledge he is confronted with an asset in which someone may have rights, even
if at the time he neither knows nor is expected to know the
identity of the owner of rights. In a similar situation, the laws
of copyright impose the main burden of that risk upon the
person acting against the privilege of the right holder, while
the protection given to a good faith third party is considerably
restricted.189
Indeed, it may be argued that granting in rem protection to
trade secrets may inhibit business activity, for those involved in
it will refrain from using information derived from another
person due to the risk of it being "tainted" with prior rights.
Two possible responses may be suggested. First, it should be
remembered that economic considerations of this nature also
have a "flip side." The absence of suitable compensation provides a disincentive for the owner of the information to create
and invent, and as noted above, registration of a patent is not
always a satisfactory option. 1o Secondly, the above mentioned
risk should not be exaggerated. Information is not attained ex
nihil by those dealing in it. Either the defendant develops it
himself (in which case there is no liability because the right in
a trade secret does not confer the owner with monopoly privileges, even if the right is in rem), or he acquires the knowledge
from another person. In the latter case, there is invariably a
risk that a person transferring an asset obtained it illegally.
We may therefore expect the defendant to demand suitable
guarantees from the transferrer. Failing to do so, the risks
should be imposed upon him. It must also be remembered that
legally the owner of the information confronts considerable
difficulties in establishing his case. He has to prove the similarity between the information owned by him and the information
currently in the defendant's use. He also must persuade the
court that the information being used by the defendant has
been derived from the plaintiff. As far as damages are concerned, the plaintiff must also prove the extent of his damages,
which is normally a problematic task. These elements diminish
the actual risks being imposed upon the defendant. It should

189. See supra text accompanying notes 52-61.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
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also be remembered that similar risks exist with regard to
publishers who purchase copyright from a person purporting to
m and yet there has been no inhibibe the owner of the right,"
tion of publishers' activities.
The system should therefore strike a balance between the
rights of the owner of information who invested in its development, and the purchaser's rights. It is desirable to maintain a
certain measure of judicial discretion in balancing the parties'
interests in order to allow a satisfactory solution in each case.
The factors which should be considered when exercising discretion include the kind of activity, the scope of investments required for the development of the information, and the expenses
involved in revealing the identity of the true owner. While
conceding that we are dealing with a proprietary interest in
which some initial publicity of the identity of the owner has
existed, discretion should not easily be exercised in the
defendant's favor. Even in cases in which such discretion is
exercised, it would seem appropriate to suffice with the protection of the reliance interest of the defendant without protecting
his expectation interest.
Should the defendant be granted complete immunity against
liability for damages during the period before either his knowing or being obliged to know of the prior rights, as is the case
in the American law? It has already been noted that such immunity is not commensurate with the approach currently adopted in the area of tangible property."' If this thesis is accepted, assuming the existence of reasonable publicity of the right
in a trade secret, imposition of liability for damages should not
ab initio be denied during the interim period. During this time,
the general law is that a party performing a conversion of movables, even in good faith, is liable for a claim in damages, and
during this time, the law of copyright exposes innocent third
parties to a high level of risk. Nevertheless, policy considerations attempting to maximize the free flow of information
essential for a dynamic market justify the approach of the
American law which avoids imposition of such liability. Partial
immunity from damages, combined with judicial discretion to

191. See supra text accompanying notes 52-61.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
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condition the granting of an injunction against an innocent
third party with the reimbursement of the third party for his
reliance losses, ensures that the risk assumed by the third
party would be a limited one. Consequently, even though his
expectation interest would not regularly be protected unless an
injunction order is denied there is still the possibility of restoring the defendant to his original position with neither a loss
nor a gain. Such a solution guarantees a reasonable balance
between the proprietary interest of the owner of the information and the need to facilitate the free flow of information.
Is there a justification for distinguishing the rigid solution, in
the area of copyright from the more flexible solution for the
third party in the area of trade secrets? A distinction may be
made between the risk regarding rights in movables, as opposed to the risks regarding rights in trade secrets, in view of
the interest in preserving a dynamic flow of information. Yet,
the question remains whether there should be a more lenient,
flexible approach in the third parties' favor within the trade
secret law, while a more rigid approach should be adopted regarding third parties' risks in the area of copyright. If the two
areas should be analogous in terms of the extent of the risk
imposed upon third parties, then the conclusion would seem to
demand the adoption of a more rigid approach in the area of
trade secrets law.
The question is whether a distinction should be drawn between the weight attached to the constitutional interests confronting copyright and those confronting the right in a trade
secret. The right in a trade secret competes with interests similar to those competing with copyright. Both rights limit society's
capacity to use intellectual advances. Both are rights that restrict freedom of occupation, as copyright applies also to works
dealing with commercial issues, like commercial catalogues."
Both of these rights limit freedom of expression by preventing
publication of knowledge (in the area of trade secrets) or expressions (in the area of copyright) similar with those for which
protection is sought.'

193. See CORNISH, supra note 18, at 269; 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, § 2.14.2.

194. For the similarity test in the field of Copyright, see 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note
9, § 7.1.1.
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Yet, it would seem that society's interest in the free flow of
information is greater than its interest in the free flow of a
specific mode of expression. As mentioned above, only the mode
of expression is being protected by copyright law. Thus, with
respect to information, there ought to be greater leeway for
third parties. An idea is usually open to a variety of modes of
expression. Blocking the possibility of free usage of one of the
modes of expression is less damaging to society and its development than is the negation of the possibility of using the "fountain" from which many "rivers" of expression flow. This distinction does effect the intensity of the right, so that the intensity of the right in a trade secret should be somewhat less than
that of copyright, and not be conferred with total in rem protection. The above multidimensional analysis now calls for its
resolution. How are we to classify the right in a trade secret in
light of all of the above?
An approach leading to unqualified negation of rights acquired by third parties in good faith is unacceptable. An
approach conferring absolute immunity to such third parties is
equally inappropriate. Thus, a flexible approach -is required.
Three possible legal models may provide a flexible solution. One
option is to adopt an arrangement that totally negates the in
rem status of the right in a trade secret, relying instead on the
protection offered by general tort law. The flexibility of the tort
of negligence is particularly advantageous in the context
discussed.
Yet, the main difficulty of this approach is that for a claim to
succeed in negligence, an element of fault must be proved. In
cases of good faith purchase, when the defendant should not be
aware of the owner's rights, there is no fault on behalf of the
third party even if he continues using the secret after having
become aware of the rights of the plaintiff. Thus, there would
not be grounds. for a claim against him. There is no fault in
continuing to use information which has been innocently acquired and relied upon. While no cause of action in negligence
arises in such circumstances, the defendant would also be totally immune from any kind of mandatory order. There would
consequently be no possibility of providing wider protection for
the owner of a secret against good faith purchasers, not even by
way of discretionary power in appropriate cases. Therefore, even
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though protection through tort law is flexible and has many
advantages over the in rem claim, this flexibility has its limits.
Assuming that at least in certain cases it is desirable to grant
an injunction against a good faith purchaser, the tort of negligence does not provide an appropriate solution.
A second version is to view the right in a trade secret as a
quasi in rem right. Yet, the quasi in rem concept is problematic
in this context, both in terms of its results and the positive
law. In terms of the results, a quasi in rem right would be
totally powerless against a good faith purchaser for value. In
the case of a trade secret, increased effect should be related to
owner's rights, exposing innocent third parties to the owner's
rights at least in some cases. This is due to the right in a trade
secret consisting of features that normally characterize an in
rem right and as a matter of policy. As noted above, the analogy with copyright invites the possibility of detracting from third
party rights in certain circumstances, even though not with the
full intensity of copyright law. Viewing the right in trade secrets as being "quasi in rem" is therefore insufficient.
The third and most preferred approach, is to view the right
in trade secrets as a right with particular features that may be
categorized as a "cognate in rem right." The intention here is
not a quasi in rem right as recognized in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but rather a right with special characteristics, which
on an intensite scale is placed somewhere above the quasi in
rem right, but below the classic in rem right.
We must now address the legitimacy of acknowledging a new
classification within the proprietary rights, a right which is
neither obligatory, nor in rem, nor quasi in rem. I submit that
nothing prevents such classification. Classification of rights
should not take place according to rigid categories. Rights have
a fluid quality. Just as the law is dynamic, so are its categories. When confronted with a legal phenomenon bearing special
characteristics, the specificity should be recognized and rigid
classification avoided in cases where rigidity leads to a distortion of the features of the right under discussion. In this sense,
the law of trade secrets makes its contribution to general jurisprudence, creating a new "status": a proprietary right conferring
limited immunity to innocent third parties with respect to damages and also allowing a degree of judicial discretion un-
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available for infringements of in rem rights. Application of this
discretion is not limited to denying the right to an injunction
against third parties. It also applies to the possibility of permitting continued use of the information by the defendant, without
being subject to liability for damages. Yet, this status is characterized by the assumption that, as a general rule, even the good
faith purchaser for value will be subject to the rights of the
originally entitled party, while application of a court's discretion
in favor of such purchaser is not taken for granted. Weighty
reasons must exist for its application, the general tendency
being to protect at the utmost only the reliance interest of the
innocent party, and not his expectation interest. In this sense,
the abovementioned classification would confer upon the owner
of the trade secret protection more effective than that generally
provided by way of equitable remedies preventing breach of
confidence in English law, under which the basic assumption is
one of wide protection to the good faith purchaser for value.
The "cognate in rem" model for trade secrets is the model
that has in fact been adopted by the American system. The
analysis in this article demonstrates that this is indeed the
desired approach and that for principles of jurisprudence, this
is the best of the various possible models. The law created a
new status in the classification of rights. Awareness to this
classification of the right is important not only from the theoretical point of view, but also for the positive interpretation of
the law. It indicates that the judicial discretion according to the
UTSA and the case law in favor of the good faith purchaser for
value should be applied only selectively. The basic assumption
is that, as a matter of rule, trade secrets should be attributed
with in rem protection. Judicial discretion must also avoid conferring protection to the expectation interest of the purchaser
for value. The intensity of the cognate in rem right of the owner of the secret requires that the third party be, at the utmost,
granted protection only for his reliance interest.

